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I. INTRODUCTION: THE “NECESSARY AND PROPER” EXERCISE OF THE FEDERAL TREATY
POWER

The Treaty Clause of the United States Constitution declares that the President
“shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties,
provided two thirds of the Senators present concur.”1 A casual inspection of the stark
text of the Treaty Clause seems to yield two seemingly obvious propositions: that the
Treaty Clause is an affirmative grant of power to both the President and the Senate and
that there are no internal textual limitations on the scope of the federal treaty power.
Both of these seemingly obvious propositions are long-settled law. Both propositions are
supported by a strong academic and historical consensus. And both propositions are
wrong as a matter of the Constitution’s original meaning.
The Constitution’s Treaty Clause does in fact grant power to the Senate, but it
grants no power to the President that he or she does not otherwise possess by virtue of
“[t]he executive Power” vested by the first sentence of Article II.2 The Treaty Clause
confirms, clarifies, and qualifies the President’s power to make treaties, but it does not
grant that power. Moreover, the federal treaty power is subject to very substantial, albeit
subtle, constitutional limitations on its exercise. If properly viewed through the lens of

* Professor, Boston University School of Law. We are grateful to David Golove, Vasan Kesavan, and the
participants at a workshop at Boston University School of Law for valuable comments. This article
expands on material that appears in Chapter 2 of a book that we have published, see Gary Lawson & Guy
Seidman, The Constitution of Empire: Territorial Expansion and American Legal History 33-72
(2004), and we thank Yale University Press for permission to utilize and build upon that material.
** Assistant Professor, Interdisclinary Center, Herzliya.
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U.S. Const. art II, § 2, cl 2.

2

Id. art. II, § 1.

2

original meaning, the treaty power can only be used to implement or carry into effect
other federal powers granted by the Constitution, and any such implementational use of
the federal treaty power must be proportionate, measured, and respectful of background
principles concerning rights and governmental structure. In other words, any exercise of
the federal treaty power must be -- to borrow a phrase from another constitutional
provision – “necessary and proper for carrying into Execution”3 other federal powers.
There is both much more and much less to the Treaty Clause than meets the eye.
The theory of the Treaty Clause that we present here, which views treaties solely
as devices for reasonably implementing other constitutional powers, was inspired by
Thomas Jefferson, who articulated a similar view of the clause more than 200 years ago.
We hasten to add that Jefferson’s position was never historically ascendant, and Jefferson
himself did not develop or defend the position in precisely the fashion that we do. We do
not ground our position on the authority of Jefferson or on the weight of sympathy with
Jefferson’s views expressed by other founding-era figures. Rather, we base our claims
about the Constitution’s original meaning on the text and structure of the Constitution
itself.4
A proper understanding of the treaty power is essential to an integrated
understanding of American constitutionalism. The treaty power has always been one of
the most important, and most controversial, federal powers. In the founding era, it was at
the center of issues concerning the very character of the nation, such as territorial
expansion and the eligibility of aliens to own real property. In recent years, the rise of
3

Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.

4

For those who wonder how a view that was not ascendant in Jefferson’s own time could possibly
represent the Constitution’s original meaning, see infra XX.
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globalization and the resulting proliferation of treaties addressing an ever-increasing
range of subjects has put the treaty power equally at the center of modern constitutional
debate. The Treaty Clause’s original meaning, of course, will not be regarded by
everyone as decisive, or even relevant, to that debate. But for those who consider
original meaning to be in any respect important or interesting, we hope to provoke some
thought about a long-misunderstood constitutional clause.
The Treaty Clause is located in Article II, section 2 of the Constitution. Section 1
of Article II begins by vesting “[t]he executive Power” of the United States in the
President. This clause is a grant of power – the “executive Power” – to the President.5
That “executive Power” includes the power to make treaties. The Treaty Clause, as is
true of many of the provisions in sections 2 and 3 of Article II, confirms the existence of
that particular presidential power and qualifies it by requiring Senate ratification of
treaties, but the President’s treaty power derives from the Article II Vesting Clause rather
than from the Treaty Clause.
The source of the power has important implications for its scope. Executive
power of the kind granted by the Article II Vesting Clause is generally implementational
by nature; it is the power to carry into effect law made by other actors.6 The treaty
power, as an aspect of the executive power, shares this implementational nature; it is the
power to carry law into effect in the international arena. Furthermore, executive power is
generally subject to the principle of reasonableness, which is a venerable principle of
British administrative law that requires exercises of delegated implementational power,

5

See infra XX.

6

See infra XX.
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such as executive power, to be proportionate, measured, efficacious, and rightsregarding.7 The treaty power, as an implementational executive power, must conform to
the principle of reasonableness. Thus, federal treaties must carry into effect some federal
power other than the treaty power itself, and they must do so in a reasonable,
proportionate, rights-regarding manner.
To be sure, this “Jeffersonian” or “implementational” (and we will henceforth use
those terms interchangeably) conception of the treaty power is at least facially
problematic along every dimension that might be thought relevant for constitutional
meaning: textual, intratextual, structural, historical, and doctrinal. Textually, the Treaty
Clause is phrased as an unlimited grant of power. Intratextually, the Article I Sweeping
Clause expressly limits Congress’s implementational legislative powers to the enactment
of “Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution” 8 other federal
powers, which shows that the founding generation knew how to draft a “necessary and
proper for carrying into Execution” requirement when it wanted one. Structurally, the
Treaty Clause requires consent to treaties by two-thirds of the Senate, which suggests that
the Constitution’s chosen method for limiting treaties might be procedural rather than
substantive. Historically, although our position was not utterly alien to the founding
generation, it is distinctly anti-historical in most important respects. And doctrinally, it
has been settled law at least since the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in 1920 in

7

See infra XX.

8

U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. Today, this clause is generally known as the “Necessary and Proper
Clause.” The founding generation, however, consistently referred to it as the “Sweeping Clause,” and we
employ the original label here.

5

Missouri v. Holland9 that the Treaty Clause serves as a head of federal jurisdiction
independent of, and potentially broader than, the other enumerated powers of the federal
government. Professor Gerald Neuman exemplifies the dominant doctrinal and academic
consensus when he describes the Treaty Clause as “an independent grant of power to the
federal government to enter into treaties that enact rules that Congress might not
otherwise have been able to enact.”10
In the course of this article, we will address all of these concerns. Some of them
dissolve fairly quickly under close scrutiny. Others are substantial but ultimately not
fatal to our understanding of the Treaty Clause. In the end, there is no theory of the
Treaty Clause that does not encounter very serious interpretative problems. We do not
claim that our interpretation of the Treaty Clause can be established beyond a reasonable
doubt, but only that our theory is a better account of the Constitution’s original meaning
than any competing alternatives.11

9

252 U.S. 416 (1920) (holding that the President and Senate could by treaty regulate the hunting of
migratory birds in a fashion that went beyond then-established limitations on Congress’s legislative
powers).
10

Gerald L. Neuman, The Nationalization of Civil Liberties, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1630, 1646-47 (1999).
This classic conception of the Treaty Clause has been defended with extraordinary thoroughness and
sophistication by David Golove. See David M. Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical
Foundations of the Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 1075 (2000).
11

This raises the thorny problem of the appropriate standard of proof for claims about constitutional
meaning – a problem that one of us has pondered at considerable length elsewhere. See Gary Lawson,
Proving the Law, 86 Nw. U.L. Rev. 859 (1992); Gary Lawson, Legal Indeterminacy: Its Cause and Cure,
19 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 411 (1996). If propositions about constitutional meaning should only be
accepted if they are proved beyond a reasonable doubt, relatively few propositions deserve acceptance. We
are not prepared to say that our claims about the Treaty Clause meet that lofty standard. But if propositions
should be accepted under a lower threshold, such as a “preponderance of the evidence” or a “best available
alternative” standard, then we think that we have a good case for acceptance. And one must keep in mind
that the proper standard for acceptance may well vary with the context: the standard for acceptance in
scholarship may not be the same as the standard for acceptance in adjudication. See Lawson, Proving the
Law, supra, at 877-80; note XX, infra.

6

The argument that we construct proceeds in several discrete steps. In Part II, we
define our interpretative approach, which we label “reasonable-observer originalism.”
This approach looks for the meaning that would have been attributed to the Constitution
by a reasonable founding-era observer in possession of all relevant information. The
methodology is thus originalist but not strictly historical. Interpretation is a legal rather
than historical enterprise, and we accordingly look primarily for hypothetical
understandings that would have existed under ideal counterfactual conditions rather than
for actual understandings.
In Part III, we define what we mean by an “implementational” theory of the treaty
power and present its Jeffersonian roots. This discussion defines the limited scope of our
inquiry. There are a great many important questions concerning the federal treaty power
that we do not address in this article, such as whether treaties are the exclusive method by
which the federal government can enter into binding international arrangements and
whether treaties can ever take effect without need for implementing legislation. Our
study is confined to the basic question whether the treaty power is, as current doctrine
maintains, a unique kind of quasi-legislative power that defines its own sphere of
jurisdiction or, as Jefferson maintained, purely an implementational power that can only
act to implement other exercises of federal power. That is more than enough to keep us
busy.
In Part IV, we establish some basic textual truths about the treaty power, the most
jarring of which, at least to modern sensibilities, is that many express constitutional
restrictions, most notably including the First Amendment, do not apply to the treaty
power. These truths become important at a subsequent stage of our argument when we

7

examine the structural and consequentialist arguments for the implementational theory of
the Treaty Clause.
In Part V, we present the bulk of our substantive argument by establishing that the
Treaty Clause does not grant any power to the President but rather confirms and qualifies
a presidential power derived from the Vesting Clause of Article II. This crucial step in
the argument requires us to construct a comprehensive theory of Article II of the
Constitution. In particular, in order to understand the Treaty Clause, one must first clear
away the widespread misconception that the President draws power from sections 2 and 3
of Article II. The provisions in those sections confirm, clarify, and qualify presidential
powers, and in some cases impose presidential duties, but they do not grant powers that
are not otherwise derived from the Vesting Clause.
We further show how the treaty power’s executive pedigree defines its scope and
limits. Executive power is essentially implementational power, and to the extent that the
treaty power is executive, it shares this character. Further, implementational executive
power must be exercised in accordance with the principle of reasonableness, which in the
eighteenth-century was a bedrock principle that required delegated executive power to be
exercised in a measured, efficacious, and substantively reasonable fashion. Federal
treaties must therefore implement federal powers in a proportionate and rights-regarding
manner.
Part VI cements the case for the Jeffersonian, implementational theory of the
treaty power by presenting consequentialist and epistemological reasons why the
implementational view is the best originalist account of the federal treaty power. The
implementational view avoids what are otherwise bizarre results, and although it limits

8

the federal treaty power more than has the law over the past 200 years, it does not reach
results that the founding generation would have found absurd.
Part VII ends our discussion with some concluding remarks from Thomas
Jefferson about his own theory. Jefferson did not claim that his theory of the treaty
power was without flaws. Far from it. He claimed only that it was better than any other
theory that had been put forward. That is our claim as well. To paraphrase Churchill, the
implementational theory of the treaty power is the worst possible theory except for all of
the others.

II. TAKING INTERPRETATION SERIOUSLY: DEFINING “REASONABLE-OBSERVER
ORIGINALISM”
Before we pursue our task in earnest, we first need to define our interpretative
approach. We conduct our inquiry using what we call “reasonable-observer
originalism,”which holds that the Constitution means what a fully-informed original
audience would have understood it to mean after considering all relevant evidence and
arguments. Under this approach, original meaning represents hypothetical mental states
that would have existed under (probably) counterfactual circumstances rather than actual
mental states held by concrete historical persons. It would require a book to explore the
rationale for and mechanics of this approach, and that is certainly not our project here.12
But a few brief comments are appropriate.

12

For some introductory thoughts on this approach, see Lawson & Seidman, supra note *, at 7-13; Vasan
Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution’s Secret Drafting History,
91 Geo. L.J. 1113 (2003); Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, The First “Establishment” Clause: Article VII
and the Post-Constitutional Confederation, 78 Notre Dame L. Rev. 83, 87-93 (2002); Gary Lawson, On
Reading Recipes . . . and Constitutions, 85 Geo LJ 1823 (1997).

9

Law often tries to understand human affairs from the perspective of an ideal
person rather than from the perspective of the actual actors in concrete cases. Tort
lawyers are familiar with the concept of the “reasonable person” as the touchstone for
legal liability, and hypothetical constructs such as the reasonable person play an
important role in other legal inquiries as well.13 The interpretation of a constitution is a
legal act. Evidence from other disciplines, such as history, psychology, political science,
or economics, can be relevant to the interpretative enterprise, but at bottom a constitution
is a legal instrument that can only be understood in legal terms.
The perspective of a reasonable, fully-informed observer has always been
implicitly understood by lawyers to be the appropriate perspective for constitutional
interpretation. Disputes about documentary meaning have never been thought to be fully
resolvable by reference to nose counts, as would be true if actual mental states were the
ultimate touchstone of reasoning. Today, as in the eighteenth century,
[p]eople give reasons for their views of meaning, and those reasons do not
inevitably reduce to some calculation involving actual mental states. Those
reasons can involve pointing out some feature of the document that one’s
opponents have not yet seen, or have undervalued, or have refused to
acknowledge for political or other reasons. In other words, they refer to mental
states that would or might exist under counterfactual circumstances. Those
reasons can also, of course, include reference to actual mental states; one can
certainly invoke the numbers, the eminence, or both of the proponents of a
particular viewpoint. But those actual mental states are evidence of meaning; they
are not constitutive of meaning.14

13

We plan to explore this seemingly universal feature of legal systems in more depth in a subsequent
work.

14

Lawson & Seidman, supra note XX, at 91.

10

One of us has elsewhere identified the basic differences (and similarities) between
reasonable-observer originalism and various intentionalist or historicist methodologies
that might be more familiar:
Operationally, the difference between reasonable-observer originalism and
“intentionalist” approaches concerns the weight that is properly given to pieces of
evidence rather than the admissibility of that evidence. Reasonable-observer
originalism focuses on what a fully informed, unbiased observer would have
concluded after weighing all relevant evidence. The expressed views of concrete
historical individuals can provide modest evidence of what a reasonable observer
would have concluded, but they are hardly the touchstone of an inquiry into
meaning. Actual participants in actual debates were not always in possession of
all relevant information, were not always unbiased observers, and were not
always (given the real-world stakes involved) necessarily honest about their own
thoughts or their perceptions of the thoughts of others. This is true of all forms of
expressed views, including statements or actions of framers or ratifiers, statements
or actions of legislators or executive officials, and statements or actions of judges.
Precedents, whether testimonial, legislative, or judicial, are relatively weak
evidence of original meaning. Such evidence generally pales before evidence
drawn from text, structure, interpretative conventions, and general background
understandings about language, the document in question, and the world in which
the document is embedded.15
An approach such as ours that privileges an objective, hypothetical meaning does not
consider materials such as “the records of the constitutional convention, the ratification
debates, The Federalist, and early governmental practice” to be “the canonical originalist
sources.”16 Instead, “one must always be prepared to ask whether an expressed
understanding would have been different if the utterer had known or thought about X, Y,
and Z.”17 A view that received only minimal expression during the founding era could

15

Gary Lawson, Discretion as Delegation: The “Proper” Understanding of the Nondelegation Doctrine, 73
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1701, 1707-08.

16

Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1721,
1733 (2002). See also Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 Yale L. J. 1725, 1788 (1996)
(taking for granted – mistakenly, our approach maintains -- that sound originalist arguments must focus on
history, at least where texts are not clear on their face).
17

Gary Lawson, Controlling Precedent: Congressional Regulation of Judicial Decision-Making, 18 Const.
Comm. 191, 196 n.20 (2001).
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nonetheless represent the original meaning of the Constitution if one concludes that a
fully-informed audience, after considering all of the relevant arguments, including
arguments that may not have occurred to anyone at the time, would have accepted that
view as correct.
Put as simply as possible, our approach downplays, though it does not eliminate,
the relevance of actual expressions of mental states and emphasizes the relevance of
arguments from the text, organization, and context of the Constitution considered as a
whole.18 To a reasonable-observer originalist, arguments from structure and first
principles can easily outweigh even very impressive evidence about concrete historical
understandings. “Original understandings were not necessarily original meanings.”19

18

Of course, the expressed mental states of government officials, such as judges, are important to know if
one wants to avoid getting into trouble with armed agents of the state, but they do not have a privileged
status for determining the actual meaning of the Constitution.
19

Lawson & Seidman, supra note *, at 12. The obvious objection to reasonable-observer originalism is:
how can the authority of the Constitution possibly be grounded in hypothetical mental states that may never
have existed? The obvious objection to the obvious objection is: this question confuses issues about the
Constitution’s meaning with issues about the Constitution’s authority. We are making no claims about the
Constitution’s political or moral authority; we simply seek to uncover facts about its meaning. One cannot
know how much (if any) normative force the Constitution exerts without first knowing what the
Constitution actually says. Put another way, understanding a constitution and deciding whether to follow it
are two distinct operations. The nature of the document and the nature of communication tell you how to
discern a document’s meaning, though not what to do with that meaning once you have it.
More precisely, the nature of the document tells you part of what you need to know in order to interpret
it. Michael Dorf, in a characteristically thoughtful response to some of Professor Lawson’s prior work in
this vein, see Gary Lawson, On Reading Recipes . . . and Constitutions, 85 Geo. L. J. 1823 (1997), has
forcefully denied that interpretation can be divorced from normative concerns because “[w]hether we
equate meaning with original public meaning, or with speaker’s meaning, or with a dynamic conception of
meaning, or with something else, depends on why we care about the meaning of whatever it is we are
interpreting.” Michael C. Dorf, Recipe for Trouble: Some Thoughts on Meaning, Translation and
Normative Theory, 85 Geo LJ 1857, 1858 (1997). Professor Lawson has elsewhere agreed that the
answers to at least some interpretative questions are “inescapably normative, depending heavily on the end
one seeks to serve through interpretation.” Gary Lawson, Proving the Law, supra note XX, at 860. It is
crucial, however, to understand the particular respects in which interpretation, of a constitution or anything
else, is and is not necessarily a normative enterprise.
Propositions about meaning are propositions. Anything that is true of propositions in general is also
true of propositions about meaning. One important truth about propositions is that the proof of any
proposition requires three elements: principles of admissibility that tell you which considerations count for
or against a proposition’s truth, principles of significance which tell you how much (relative) weight to give
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III. TAKING JEFFERSON SERIOUSLY: DEFINING THE IMPLEMENTATIONAL TREATY POWER

A. Avoiding False Starts

The federal treaty power has been the subject of substantial debate from the
nation’s earliest days to the present. The framing generation worried about such
questions as whether the President and a two-thirds majority of the Senate could cede
some or all of a state’s territory to a foreign power.20 Early twentieth-century thinkers,
echoing previous debates, wondered whether the treaty power could be used to create
regulatory laws that are beyond the enumerated legislative powers of Congress.21
Modern scholars debate whether treaties can override otherwise applicable constitutional
limitations, such as the prohibition on federal commandeering of state governmental

to different sets of admissible evidence, and standards of proof which tell you how much evidence is
necessary in order to proclaim the truth value of a proposition.
Normative considerations enter at the last stage where one determines the standard of proof or level of
evidence that is epistemologically required in order to make a declaration of truth. There is no way to
separate that determination from the consequences of a truth declaration; the standard of proof appropriate
to an ivory-tower scholar considering the meaning of the Engagements Clause is not necessarily the same
as the standard of proof appropriate to the President of the United States deciding whether a certain state of
affairs justifies the launch of thermonuclear missiles. But by the same token, the correct principles of
admissibility and significance for documents are objective facts. It is possible to monkey around with the
rules of admissibility and significance for a document such as the Constitution, just as it is possible to
monkey around with the rules of admissibility and significance for proving ordinary facts about events in
the world. The law does it all of the time through rules of evidence. But to do so is deliberately to sacrifice
the search for truth in favor of other values. There may, of course, be many circumstances in which there is
a good normative case for sacrificing the search for truth about constitutional meaning in favor of other
values, but the scholarly enterprise is not one of them.
20

See Vasan Kesavan, The Treaty-Making Power and American Federalism: An Originalist Proof for
Missouri v Holland (unpublished manuscript, Dec. 9, 2001).
21

See id., n.3.
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processes,22 and whether treaties can extend only to a limited range of subjects that are
properly a matter for international agreement.23 Overlaying these debates is the
perennial question whether and when treaties are self-executing--that is, take effect as
domestic law without legislative implementation.24 And the prevalence of executive
agreements, with or without congressional approval, raises the additional question
whether the treaty power is the exclusive mechanism by which the United States can
make binding international commitments.25
Historically, the most important of these debates has been whether the federal
treaty power extends to matters beyond the legislative competence of Congress. Can the
President and Senate, by treaty, regulate subjects that the President and Congress,
22

See, e.g., Martin H. Flaherty, Are We to Be a Nation? Federal Power vs. “States Rights” in Foreign
Affairs, 70 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1277 (1999); Gerald L. Neuman, The Nationalization of Civil Liberties
Revisited, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1630, 1650-55 (1999).
23

See Robert Anderson IV, “Ascertained in a Different Way”: The Treaty Power at the Crossroads of
Contract, Compact, and Constitution, 69 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 189 (2001) (arguing that the treaty power is
limited to provisions resulting from the good-faith negotiations of the parties); Caleb Nelson, The Treaty
Power and Self-Execution: A Comment on Professor Woolhandler’s Article, 42 Va. J. Int’l L. 801, 812-14
(2002) (suggesting that treaties that concern only the internal affairs of the treating nations may not
constitute treaties within the meaning of the Constitution).
24

In 1999, this question was the subject of a 303-page exchange in the pages of the Columbia Law
Review between John Yoo, who defends the view that at least some treaties are not self –executing, and
Martin Flaherty and Carlos Vazquez, who defend a stronger vision of self-execution. Compare John C.
Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and the Original Understanding, 99
Colum. L. Rev. 1955 (1999); John C. Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking: A Textual and Structural
Defense of Non-Self-Execution, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 2218 (1999) with Martin S. Flaherty, History Right?:
Historical Scholarship, Original Understanding, and Treaties As “Supreme Law of the Land,” 99 Colum.
L. Rev. 2095 (1999); Carlos Manual Vazquez, Laughing At Treaties, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 2154 (1999). For
an alternative view that would give self-executing effect only to treaties that do not conflict with existing
statutory law, see Vasan Kesavan, The Three Tiers of Federal Law (unpublished manuscript, June 4, 2002).
25

This question has prompted modern debates that approach in length, intensity, and variety the recent
debates on self-execution. Compare Bruce A. Ackerman & David M. Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?,
108 Harv. L. Rev. 799 (1995) (treaties and executive agreements are interchangeable because of an
unwritten constitutional amendment) with Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously:
Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 1221 (1995) (treaties
and executive agreements are not interchangeable because the Constitution does not contain amendments
written in invisible ink) with John C. Yoo, Laws As Treaties?: The Constitutionality of CongressionalExecutive Agreements, 99 Mich. L. Rev. 757 (2001) (treaties and executive agreements are sometimes
interchangeable because of contemporary practice).

14

through legislation, cannot? This question whether there is a precise congruence between
the jurisdictional scope of the treaty power and the scope of Congress’s legislative power
was the basis for founding-era objections to treaty provisions dealing with such matters
as alien ownership of real property.26 It was central to the Southern antebellum critique
of federal treaties that interfered with Southern regulation of slavery.27 It was the precise
issue decided by the Supreme Court in Missouri v Holland, which held that Congress
could implement treaties creating international commitments regarding migratory birds
even though Congress and the President could not (under then-existing understandings)
constitutionally regulate that subject under any of the enumerated Article I legislative
powers.28 In the wake of Holland, the relation between the treaty power and Congress’s
legislative powers was the subject of the attempt led by Senator John Bricker in the 1950s
to amend the Constitution, most dramatically by a provision that would have stipulated
(either as clarification or alteration of the Treaty Clause) that “[a] treaty shall become
effective as internal law in the United States only through legislation which would be
valid in the absence of treaty.”29 This question about the relationship between the treaty
power and the legislative power has been the subject of extensive legal commentary for a
century. It is not the precise question that we seek to answer here.

26

See Golove, supra note 10, at 1104-27.

27

See id., 1210-37.

28

252 U.S. 469 (1920). Today, under modern understandings of Congress’s power to “regulate
Commerce . . . among the several States,” U.S. Const art I, § 8, cl 3, it is virtually certain that Congress
would be allowed to pass a statute to protect migratory birds without recourse to a treaty.

29

For a thorough (albeit decidedly unsympathetic) detailing of the progress, and near-passage, of the
Bricker Amendment, see Duane Tananbaum, The Bricker Amendment Controversy: A Test of
Eisenhower’s Political Leadership (1988).

15

We consider this question to be a non-starter, as there is no plausible reason to
suppose that the treaty power can extend only to subjects within Congress’s enumerated
powers. Vasan Kesavan has endeavored to demonstrate that at least one universally
accepted function of treaties -- the cession of territory to another country, generally as
part of a treaty of peace -- is beyond the enumerated powers of Congress.30 A much
simpler example, however, is readily available: Congress does not have the power to end
a war, but the President and the Senate can formalize the end of a war by treaty.
Congress, of course, can effectively end a war by refusing to fund the war effort, but it has
no formal power, either internationally or domestically, to terminate a war.31 Thus, if the
debate really focuses on whether the Constitution’s presidential/senatorial treaty-making
power is precisely coextensive with the congressional/presidential lawmaking power, it is
much ado about nothing.
This long-standing focus on whether the treaty power and the legislative power
are congruent is a distraction. We focus on a broader and more fundamental question: is
the treaty power jurisdictional, in the sense that it describes a distinctive area of federal
competence independent of other grants of enumerated power, or implementational, in
the sense that treaties are only permitted to carry into effect other exercises of enumerated
national power? Thomas Jefferson said the latter, and Thomas Jefferson was right.

B. The Ties That Bind
30
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Powers, 84 Cal. L. Rev. 167, 265 (1996). Congress could enact a statute declaring peace, and perhaps that
statute would have domestic consequences if other statutes are contingently triggered by such a legislative
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16

Before we present Jefferson’s theory, however, we must first identify the
distinctive nature of treaties. What can one do through treaties that cannot be done by
some other legal act? The answer is that domestic legislation cannot legally bind either
foreign sovereigns or future American governmental actors. Congress can, within its
constitutional authority, bind citizens, states, and the national government. It can even
create legal rights in foreign governments and give those foreign governments
enforcement power in American courts. But Congress cannot regulate foreign sovereigns
or prevent itself or future Congresses from altering statutory rights granted to foreign
governments. For those tasks, the nation needs treaties: legally binding consensual
arrangements between or among sovereigns.
Suppose that the United States and France want to enter into an agreement
providing for reciprocal duty-free entry of perfumes. Congress can pass a law exempting
French perfumes from all American duties. But if Congress later changes that law, the
French government would have no legal recourse. The French government could change
its own domestic law, make diplomatic hay, begin a trade war, or even throw legality to
the wind and begin a shooting war, but the American action would not violate any legal
norm. If, however, the arrangement is embodied in a treaty, then subsequent legislation
contrary to the terms of the treaty would violate international law. Congress could still
pass legislation in violation of the treaty that would be fully effective as a matter of
domestic law; the treaty does not constitutionally disable Congress. But a treaty that
“locks in” an international agreement raises the cost of such legislation by whatever
amount a violation of international law is considered or expected to entail. Similarly, a
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treaty, and only a treaty, can secure an internationally-binding agreement from a foreign
sovereign.
Treaties are thus an essential means for implementing national powers in the
international arena. The Sweeping Clause permits Congress to execute national powers
domestically (provided that such executory laws are “necessary and proper”). The Treaty
Clause similarly permits the United States, through the President and the Senate, to
implement national powers internationally by locking in intergovernmental agreements.

C. Jefferson Speaks

At least, locking in intergovernmental agreements is the most minimal function of
the Treaty Clause. It is another matter altogether to say that it is the maximal or only
function. Thomas Jefferson took that next step.32 Jefferson succinctly expressed his
constitutional view of treaties in a manual on parliamentary practice that he wrote for the
Senate while he was Vice President:
By the Constitution of the United States, this department of legislation is confined
to two branches only, of the ordinary Legislature; the President originating, and
Senate having a negative. To what subject this power extends, has not been
defined in detail by the Constitution; nor are we entirely agreed among ourselves.
32

Jefferson was, at least much of the time, deeply suspicious of the federal treaty power’s scope and
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1. It is admitted that it must Concern the foreign nation, party to the contract, or it
would be a mere nullity res inter alias acta. 2. By the general power to make
treaties, the Constitution must have intended to comprehend only those objects
which are usually regulated by treaty, and cannot be otherwise regulated. 3. It
must have meant to except out of these the rights reserved to the States; for surely
the President and Senate cannot do by treaty what the whole government is
interdicted from doing in any way. 4. And also to except those subjects of
legislation in which it gave a participation to the House of Representatives. This
last exception is denied by some, on the ground that it would leave very little
matter for the treaty power to work on. The less the better, say others.33
This passage obviously reflects Jefferson’s hostility to treaties,34 and it would be rash to
read it as a general expression of the sentiments of the Senate -- or indeed as a general
expression of anything other than Jefferson’s hostility to treaties. Nonetheless, it contains
some important suggestions for restrictions on the treaty power that merit examination.
Jefferson’s first proposed restriction on the treaty power -- that treaties must
genuinely concern foreign nations -- is not as obviously sound as it may seem. Jefferson
was no doubt imagining a putative “treaty” that is in fact simply an attempt to perform an
end-run around the Article I legislative process by having a foreign collaborator help
construct domestic legislation through the formalities of a treaty. Even many modern
advocates of a broad treaty power share some of these concerns about phony treaties.35
The Constitution only prohibits such arrangements, however, if the collaborative
agreement falls outside the boundaries of the term “treaty” as it appears in the
Constitution. That is, if an entirely one-sided affair, in which one party simply uses the
33
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form of a treaty to alter its domestic law, would not even count as a “treaty” for
constitutional purposes, then Jefferson was right to doubt the validity of such agreements.
Otherwise, it is hard to see why a treaty, if it really is a treaty, is unenforceable simply
because it is a bad deal -- or even a subterfuge. The Constitution lays down certain
formal rules for accomplishing certain ends, and if those formal rules are followed, the
procedure is legal unless there is some substantive limitation on the scope of the granted
power.36 A properly executed treaty is legally binding unless it either is not a treaty or it
exceeds some limitation on the scope of the treaty power that is implicit in the
constitutional structure -- which brings us to the rest of Jefferson’s analysis.
Jefferson’s second and fourth limitations -- that treaties cannot concern matters
that could “otherwise be regulated” or matters in which the Constitution “gave a
participation to the House of Representatives” -- are closely related; both suggest that
treaties cannot serve as substitutes for legislation. According to Jefferson, where the
Constitution authorizes regulation by (bicameral) legislation, regulation by treaty is
implicitly forbidden. The only sphere of application for treaties, on this understanding, is
subjects that cannot be regulated by legislation, which would obviously include the
intergovernmental “lock in” function that cannot be accomplished by legislation.
But what if certain subjects -- for instance, regulation of marriage or local land
use -- are beyond the enumerated legislative powers of Congress? Obviously, it would
not trench upon the prerogatives of Congress or the House to permit treaties to regulate
such subjects, because there would be no prerogatives upon which to trench. Just as
obviously, it would essentially constitute the federal government as a general
36
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government; anything outside the legislative powers of Congress would be within the
treaty powers of the President and Senate. That is why Jefferson added his final
limitation on the treaty power: the Constitution “must have meant to except out of these
[treaty powers] the rights reserved to the States; surely the President and Senate cannot
do by treaty what the whole government is interdicted from doing in any way.” That is,
according to Jefferson, treaties cannot reach subjects that are not within some other
enumerated federal power.
Together, Jefferson’s limitations describe a treaty power that is purely
implementational: it can carry into effect enumerated federal powers by extending them
into the international arena in legally binding fashion, but it cannot regulate on its own
initiative.
In an 1803 letter to Wilson Cary Nicholas, Jefferson repeated and elaborated this
thesis:
If [the Treaty Clause] has bounds they can be no others than the definitions of the
powers which that instrument gives. It specifies & delineates the operations
permitted to the federal government, and gives all the powers necessary to carry
these into execution. Whatever of these enumerated objects is proper for a law,
Congress may make the law; whatever is proper to be executed by way of a treaty,
the President & Senate may enter into the treaty; whatever is to be done by a
judicial sentence, the judges may pass the sentence.37
That which is “proper to be executed by way of a treaty” is to make domestic law
internationally binding or to secure binding commitments from foreign sovereigns.
Under a Jeffersonian understanding of treaties, that “lock-in” function is all that treaties
may properly accomplish. A treaty could, for instance, execute a legislated trade
agreement by entering into legally binding relations with a foreign government (or by
37
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setting up a framework that is triggered by subsequent legislation), but a treaty could not
itself establish the terms of trade apart from legislation.
The treaty power, as described by Jefferson more than 200 years ago, is a vehicle
for implementing otherwise-granted national powers in the international arena. It may be
used to carry into effect national powers found in the Constitution,38 but it cannot
function as a free-standing power, divorced from connection to the exercise of some other
enumerated power. In this respect, the Treaty Clause is analogous to the Sweeping
Clause of Article I: the Sweeping Clause permits Congress to implement otherwisegranted national powers domestically, while the treaty power permits the President and
Senate to implement otherwise-granted national powers internationally by entering into
agreements with foreign sovereigns.
A close look at the Constitution’s text and structure points, even if somewhat
crookedly, to such an implementational reading of the Treaty Clause. We must, however,
ask for patience during that close look; the argument will take some time to construct.

IV. TAKING TEXT SERIOUSLY: UNCOMFORTABLE TRUTHS ABOUT THE TREATY CLAUSE

Start with some genuinely incontrovertible facts about the constitutional text.
First, the power to make treaties is jointly vested in the President and the Senate: the
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President can “make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur . . . .”39
Thus, as with the Article I lawmaking power that is shared among the President, the
Senate, and the House,40 the Constitution commits the treaty power to a combination of
actors.
Second, the Constitution specifically denies to the states any treaty-making
power: “No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation.”41 States may,
with the consent of Congress, “enter into an[] agreement or Compact . . . with a foreign
Power,”42 but not even the consent of Congress can authorize a state treaty.
Third, federal treaties, including treaties validly made by the Confederation
government, are “the supreme Law of the Land”43 and accordingly, by the plain terms of
the Supremacy Clause, take precedence over state statutes or state constitutions. Under
standard conflict-of-laws doctrine, they are also held to take precedence over prior
inconsistent federal statutes, though that conclusion is subject to serious question as a
matter of original meaning.44
Fourth, the First Amendment does not apply to the Treaty Power. This statement,
unlike the prior three statements, is likely to seem jarring to modern eyes, but it is as
39
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textually certain as is anything in the Constitution. The First Amendment says that
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of
the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government, for a redress of
grievances.”45 The President and Senate are not Congress, and the First Amendment by
its unmistakable terms applies only to Congress. If a treaty requires congressional
implementation for its full effect, then of course Congress could not enact implementing
legislation in violation of the First Amendment, but the treaty itself is simply beyond the
terms of the amendment.46
Modern law, of course, applies the First Amendment to the President, the courts,
and the states,47 and a fortiori to the federal treaty-making authority, but that is a textually
indefensible maneuver. To read the First Amendment to apply to entities other than
Congress is simply to abandon the enterprise of constitutional interpretation.
Of course, there may be constitutional provisions that apply to non-congressional
actors that have much the same effect as the First Amendment, so that little damage is
done by acting as though the First Amendment applies to other entities, but that is a
matter to be explored case by case. For instance, it is likely that the Privileges or
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prevents states from (at least
discriminatorily) abridging rights of speech, religion, and assembly.48 One can
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metaphorically describe this as “applying the First Amendment to the states,” but the
First Amendment itself does not apply to the states as a matter of original meaning.
Similarly, the First Amendment by its terms does not apply to executive and
judicial action. That conclusion is not as significant as it might seem at first glance, for
the simple reason that presidents and courts are not in a position to threaten rights of
speech, religion, or assembly in the same manner as is Congress. Congress, of course, is
not granted any enumerated power to regulate speech, religion, or assembly, and the First
Amendment was accordingly simply repeating limits on the lawmaking power that were
already contained in the original constitutional structure.49 Nonetheless, one can readily
imagine that Congress might try to misuse its authority under the Sweeping Clause to
implement federal powers through methods that implicate rights of speech or religion,
such as by banning criticism of import laws in order to maximize their effectiveness.
These laws, if enacted, would not be “necessary and proper” for effectuating federal
powers, and Congress accordingly never had any enumerated constitutional authority to
enact them, but it is easy to understand why people in 1791 might have worried about the
prospect. (Those people had good cause to worry, of course, as seven years later
congressional Federalists invoked the Sweeping Clause as authorization for the Sedition

Clause protects some First Amendment rights against discriminatory state action, see John Harrison,
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Act of 1798.50) The First Amendment was designed to quell concerns about such
exercises of congressional power by confirming that Congress has no enumerated power,
express or implied, to abridge freedom of speech or religion, regulate the establishment
of religion, etc., in the course of implementing federal powers. There is no presidential
power that poses an equivalent threat to free speech or religion. The President has
various executive and war-making powers, but none of those powers remotely would
justify presidential action, in the absence of statute, restricting speech or religion in
domestic territory. There is accordingly nothing for the First Amendment to clarify with
respect to presidential power, because there is no perceptible danger.51 Courts, of course,
can take actions that implicate speech, such as entering libel judgments or issuing
protective orders, but no one in 1791 would have imagined that those actions, in the
ordinary course of carrying out “[t]he judicial Power,” raise any constitutional issues.
One can imagine out-of-control judges issuing bizarre orders, but such action would so
50
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blatantly exceed “[t]he judicial Power” that no clarifying or confirming amendment was
necessary.52
The simple fact is that the First Amendment by its terms does not apply to
executive or judicial actions, though of course it does limit congressional action that
seeks to “carry into Execution” executive or judicial action. That fact may be out of step
with modern sensibilities, but it is a fact nonetheless. The same is true of treaties: the
First Amendment by its express terms simply does not apply to treaties, though it applies
to congressional legislation implementing treaties. If a treaty that commits the United
States to restrictions on speech or religion is unconstitutional, it must be unconstitutional
for reasons other than the First Amendment.
For identical reasons, at least some of the prohibitions on federal action in Article
I, section 9 of the Constitution do not apply to the treaty power. The first, and to an
eighteenth-century observer the most important, of those prohibitions states that “[t]he
Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States now existing shall think
proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year one thousand
eight hundred and eight . . . .”53 This provision was specifically exempted from the
Article V amendment process until its own internal time limit ran its course.54 In other
words, Congress could not--and unamendably could not--forbid the importation of slaves
for twenty years after ratification of the Constitution. The prohibition, however, by its
terms applies only to Congress. This provision stands in stark contrast to another
52
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provision of Article I, section 9, which states that “[n]o Title of Nobility shall be granted
by the United States . . . .”55 This provision by its terms applies to any action taken on
behalf of the United States, which presumably would include treaties.56 In any event, it is
clear that the Slave Trade Clause only restricts Congress.
To pose a question that will loom large later in our story: Does that mean that in
1789, the President and Senate could have entered into a treaty that mutually forbade the
importation of slaves into the signatory countries and thus immediately ended the slave
trade, despite the fact that the combined forces of Congress, the President, and the Article
V amending authorities could not do so? If the answer is “yes,” the Treaty Clause is a
more extraordinary provision than anyone, including the founding-era opponents of
slavery, has thus far noticed. If the answer is “no,” it must be by virtue of something in
the Constitution other than Article I, section 9.
Fifth, and finally, the Treaty Clause is located in Article II of the Constitution--the
Article that primarily describes and empowers the federal government’s executive
institutions. The location of provisions in the Constitution, of course, is not an infallible
guide to their characterization. Article I, section 4, clause 3 gives the Vice President
power to preside over the Senate and to cast tie-breaking votes in that body, but although
the grant appears in Article I, it is not, strictly speaking, a grant of legislative power, for
the simple reason that the Constitution itself specifies that “[a]ll legislative Powers herein
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granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate
and House of Representatives.”57 The Senate, in turn, “shall be composed of two
Senators from each State,” which means that the Vice President is not technically a
member of the Senate and therefore cannot share in the Senate’s legislative powers.58
Similarly, even though Article I, section 7 gives the President a vital role in the
lawmaking process, the President’s presentment power cannot be considered “legislative”
for purposes of the Constitution, because the President is not Congress and only Congress
can exercise “legislative” power within the meaning of the Constitution. Whether one
wants to call these non-congressional Article I powers of the President and Vice
President “quasi-legislative” or some new term invented just for the occasion, such as
“legisecutive,” is a matter of taste, so long as one does not call them “legislative.” For
the same reasons, the Senate’s roles in the treaty-making and appointment processes do
not make senators executive actors for purposes of the Constitution, because the
“executive Power” is vested in the President alone. The Constitution’s division of power
reflects a real-world political compromise rather than a theoretically pure conception of
separated powers; one must take the Constitution’s definitions and allocations of power
as one finds them without attempting to force them into a prefabricated mold.59
Nonetheless, the basic Article I-Article II-Article III/legislative-executive-judicial
structure of the Constitution is hard to miss. Indeed, it is perhaps the Constitution’s most
obvious structural feature. The “legisecutive” lawmaking powers of the President and
57
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Vice President no doubt appear in Article I because, although they are not technically
legislative powers within the meaning of the Constitution, they more closely resemble
legislative powers than they do any of the other three basic categories of governmental
power. The Treaty Clause, by contrast, is in Article II. What, if anything, are we to
make of this placement?
Of course, once we begin to consider the implications of the Treaty Clause’s
location in Article II, we quickly leave the realm of incontrovertible textual facts and
enter the world of highly controvertible structural inferences. Structural inference is a
legitimate and powerful tool of interpretation. The power of judicial review, for instance,
is the product of inference about the scope and character of the “judicial Power” rather
than direct textual expression.60 Perhaps questions about the treaty power find their
answers in the same sources.

V. TAKING STRUCTURE SERIOUSLY: THE TREATY POWER AS AN EXECUTIVE POWER

There are two textual features of the Treaty Clause that we omitted from the prior
section. First, the Treaty Clause reads like a positive grant of power to the President and
Senate, similar to the grants of legislative power in Article I. Second, the text of the
Treaty Clause contains no evident internal limitations on the scope of its granted
authority. An informed eighteenth-century audience, after weighing all relevant
considerations, would have concluded that both of these features are in fact illusions: the
Treaty Clause is not a grant of power to the President and the Senate, and it contains quite
60
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significant internal limitations. Later, we will explain why the apparent absence of
internal textual limitations in the Treaty Clause is an illusion. First, we dispose of the
myth that the Treaty Clause is a grant of power to the President.
If the Treaty Clause appeared in Article I of the Constitution, there is little doubt
that it would constitute an affirmative grant of power to both the President and the
Senate. The Treaty Clause, however, appears in Article II. Enumerations of power in
Article II do not serve the same constitutional function as do enumerations of power in
Article I. The President’s Article II powers stem from the Vesting Clause of Article II,
which vests the “executive Power . . . in a President.” All other enumerations in Article
II clarify, qualify, or explicate the basic power grant in the Article II Vesting Clause.
This principle is the key to the meaning of the Treaty Clause, and it is controversial
enough to require an extended discussion. That discussion must begin with an analysis of
the constitutional provisions that surround Article II: the Article I and Article III
provisions that empower the federal legislature and judiciary.

A. Vested Power As Granted Power

1. A Tale of Two Articles: Legislative and Judicial Vesting

Consider the structure of Article I of the Constitution. The first section of Article
I states in full: “All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the
United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.”61 Sections
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2 and 3 describe qualities and procedures of the House and Senate as individual bodies.
Section 4 discusses election and assembly procedures for Congress and grants Congress
power to “make or alter”62 state election rules for the federal legislature. Section 5
concerns powers and procedures of the respective houses of Congress, Section 6
describes prerogatives of and limitations on individual members of Congress, and Section
7 describes the process for making laws. Section 8 specifies that “[t]he Congress shall
have Power” to engage in roughly two dozen activities spread through eighteen clauses.
Section 9 identifies specific limitations on congressional power, and Section 10 describes
limitations on states, some of which include provisions for congressional consent to or
revision of state action. Other congressional powers can be found in various places in
Articles II-V.
The language and structure of Article I, in conjunction with the rest of the
Constitution, establish the role of the initial sentence in Article I. This provision, known
as the “Article I Vesting Clause,” defines the institution of Congress, but it does not grant
any powers to Congress, and in particular it does not grant to Congress all powers that
would have been understood as “legislative” by an informed eighteenth-century audience.
Instead, it specifies that Congress – defined as the House and Senate – is the sole
institution vested with, and thus charged with exercising, whatever subset of the universe
of “legislative” powers are “herein granted” elsewhere in the Constitution. In order to
know precisely what are those “legislative Powers” that are vested in Congress, one must
read the rest of the Constitution beyond the Vesting Clause.
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Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any
time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as the Places of chusing Senators”).
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The specific enumerations of congressional power found in the Constitution,
many of which take the form of “Congress shall have Power to . . . ,” are thus exactly
what they appear to be on casual inspection: grants of power to the institution defined in
the Article I Vesting Clause. That Vesting Clause designates the holder of certain powers
conferred by the Constitution but it does not grant those powers. Article I thus has a
recognizable structure: it begins with a Vesting Clause that defines but does not empower
an institution of government and then uses specific power grants to define that
institution’s jurisdiction.
Consider now the structure of Article III. As does Article I, Article III begins
with a vesting clause: “The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain
and establish.”63 After describing the characteristics of federal judicial officers,64 Article
III goes on to say that “[t]he judicial Power shall extend”65 to nine categories of disputes.
Other provisions in Article III limit the judicial power by prescribing trial by jury for
criminal cases66 and by defining the offense of, and methods of proof for, treason,67 but
nothing else in Article III even arguably grants any power to the federal courts68 (though
at least one provision in Article III grants power to Congress69).
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U.S. Const. art. III § 1.
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See id. (“The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good
Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be
diminished during their Continuance in Office.”).
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Id. art. III, § 2.
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Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
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Id. art. III, § 3, cl. 1.

68

The Appointments Clause in Article II authorizes federal courts to receive the power to appoint inferior
federal officers if Congress chooses to grant that authority by statute, see id. Art. II, § 2, cl. 2, and the Chief
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The Article III Vesting Clause, unlike the Article I Vesting Clause, functions as a
grant of power to the federal courts. The considerations that lead to this conclusion have
been developed in a series of now-classic articles by Professor Steven Calabresi, alone
and in conjunction with Professor Saikrishna Prakash and Kevin Rhodes.70 Those
considerations turn out to be critical for understanding the structure of Article II, so they
are worth fleshing out here.
First, the language of the Article III Vesting Clause – “[t]he judicial Power shall
be vested” – strongly supports a power-grant reading. “It is very hard to read a clause
that speaks of vesting power in a particular actor as doing anything other than vesting
power in a particular actor.”71 If the Article I Vesting Clause said that “[a]ll legislative
Powers shall be vested in a Congress,” it would be similarly difficult to avoid reading that
clause as a grant of power to Congress. The Article I Vesting Clause, however, vests in
Congress only those legislative powers “herein granted,” which specifically directs us
Justice is granted the power(and duty) to preside over presidential impeachment trials. See id. Art. I, § 3,
cl. 6.
69

See id. Art. III, § 3, cl. 2 (“The Congress shall have Power to declare the Punishment of Treason”).
Conventional wisdom holds that Congress is also granted power by the so-called Exceptions Clause, which
states that in all cases in which the Supreme Court does not have constitutionally-prescribed original
jurisdiction, “the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such
Exceptions, and under such Regulations, as the Congress shall make.” Id. art. III, § 3, cl. 2. In fact,
however, this provision simply references Congress’s power over the Supreme Court’s appellate
jurisdiction. That power stems from the Sweeping Clause, not from the Exceptions Clause, which grants
no power to Congress. For an exhaustive demonstration of this basic point, see David E. Engdahl, Intrinsic
Limits of Congress’ Power Regarding the Judicial Branch, 1999 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 75.
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See Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural
Judiciary, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1153 (1992); Steven G. Calabresi, The Vesting Clauses as Power Grants, 88
Nw. U.L. Rev. 1377 (1994); Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to
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Lawson & Moore, supra note XX, at 1281.

34

beyond the Vesting Clause for the definition of the granted powers. There is no
comparable language in the Article III Vesting Clause that would lead one to look beyond
the clause itself for the definition of the federal judiciary’s power.
Second, as Professor Calabresi has discussed at some length, the dictionary
meanings of the verbs “vest” and “extend” – from the eighteenth century onward -strongly indicate that the Article III Vesting Clause grants power while Section 2 of
Article III describes the sphere of application of that power.72 As Professor Calabresi has
noted, “the verb ‘vest’ (derived from the word vestment with its connotations of royal
and ecclesiastical authority and clothing) seems to refer in this context to placing
authority in the control of the supreme and inferior courts. Put another way, it ‘clothes’
them with the authority to act.”73 Again, there is no “herein granted” language in the
Article III Vesting Clause that might lead one to question this reading.
Third, the uses in the Constitution of the word “vest” in provisions other than the
three vesting clauses strongly support the power-grant reading of the Article III Vesting
Clause. The Sweeping Clause gives Congress power to pass laws “necessary and proper
for carrying into Execution . . . all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the
Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.”74 There is no
way to read this provision as anything but a reference to powers actually granted to
various federal actors or institutions.75 Similarly, the Appointments Clause provides that
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See Calabresi, supra note XX, at 1380-81.
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Id. at 1381.
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U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (emphasis added).
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There is some ambiguity about exactly who those actors and institutions might be. It is clear enough in
what circumstances the Constitution vests authority in an “Officer” of the United States: the Vice President
is given power to preside over the Senate and to cast tie-breaking votes in that body, see id. art. I, § 3, cl. 4;
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“Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think
proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.”76
This clearly describes a circumstance in which Congress grants power to the named
actors. It is conceivable, of course, that the Article III Vesting Clause uses the word
“vest” in a manner entirely different from the usages in other constitutional provisions
and from established dictionary meanings, but that seems far less likely than the contrary.
Fourth, and finally, if the Article III Vesting Clause does not grant power to the
federal courts, it is hard to see what other clause in the Constitution does so. Professor
Michael Froomkin has argued that the federal courts’ power to decide cases (and
presumably whatever ancillary powers accompany that more basic power77) can be
derived from Section 2’s provision “extend[ing]” the judicial power to specific disputes.78

the Chief Justice is given power to preside over presidential impeachments, see id. art. I, § 3, cl. 6; and
department heads may receive authority from Congress to appoint inferior officers, see id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
It is less clear what the Sweeping Clause means by a “Department.” Does that refer to congressionallycreated executive departments, such as the Department of State or the Department of War? This seems
unlikely, because the Constitution nowhere grants any power directly to a department so defined (though
the Appointments Clause permits heads of such departments to appoint inferior officers if Congress so
directs). The better view is that the word “Department” in this context means one of the three primary units
of government in whom the Constitution itself vests considerable powers: the Congress, the President, and
the federal judiciary. That is in fact the standard usage of the word “department” in the founding era, see
Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note XX, at 1156 n.6, though certainly not the exclusive one (as the
Appointments Clause demonstrates). The most problematic portion of the Sweeping Clause is the
reference to powers vested in “the Government of the United States.” There are no powers vested by the
Constitution in “the Government of the United States” as a unitary entity; all power grants are addressed to
specific institutions or actors. The best reading of that phrase is thus something like “other principal
institutions of the Government of the United States,” which would cover the individual Houses of
Congress, which are neither “Department[s]” nor “Officer[s]” but which are granted significant powers that
it makes sense for Congress to be able to effectuate by statute. See Gary Lawson, Burning Down the
House (and Senate): A Presentment Requirement for Legislative Subpoenas under the Orders, Resolutions,
and Votes Clause, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 1373, 1386 (2005).
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Iowa L. Rev. 735 (2001).
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Thus, he says, even in the absence of the Article III Vesting Clause, one could still infer
the existence of a “judicial Power” from the fact that such a power “extends” to various
disputes. Perhaps one could make such an inference, but it seems more plausible to say
that without the Article III Vesting Clause, the judicial power would have to stem from
congressional statutes under the Sweeping Clause rather than from anything in the
Constitution itself. It would be passing strange in a constitution of limited and
enumerated powers to infer something as basic as a constitutionally-granted judicial
power. In any event, given that the actual Constitution contains the Article III Vesting
Clause, and given that the actual provision in Article III, Section 2 “extends” that power,
it makes much more sense to read the Vesting Clause as the grant of power and Section 2
as a demarcation of the boundaries of -- i.e., a limitation on or clarification of – that
power.
Taking all of these arguments into consideration, the case for reading the Article
III Vesting Clause as a grant of power to the federal courts is overwhelming. Indeed,
because the Article III Vesting Clause refers generally to the “judicial Power” rather than
to the “judicial Power herein granted,” the federal courts receive everything that would
have fallen within an informed eighteenth-century understanding of judicial power. The
jurisdictional provisions in Article III, section 2 then define the classes of disputes in
which that “judicial Power” can be applied. Section 2 thus serves as a limitation on the
judicial power rather than as a grant of judicial power: the judicial power extends, but
extends only, to the matters described in section 2. Alternatively, if the jurisdictional
grants in section 2 describe the minimum but not the maximum jurisdiction of the federal
courts, the section 2 enumerations would serve as clarifications of the scope of the
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judicial power (and perhaps as limitations on Congress’s authority to control that
jurisdiction).79
The contrast between Article I and Article III is striking. Article I begins with a
vesting clause that refers to otherwise-granted powers but does not itself grant powers.
The article then continues with a series of provisions specifying that “Congress shall have
Power” to perform a variety of activities; those provisions (in conjunction with others
scattered throughout Articles I-V) clearly define the scope of Congress’s power. The
specific enumerations of congressional power are unambiguously grants of power.
Article III, by contrast, begins with a grant of the “judicial Power,” which confers on the
federal courts all powers that fall within that general classification. The article then
continues with limitations and qualifications on that power. The specific “enumerations”
in Article III – the heads of jurisdiction in Article III, section 2 – are not grants of power.
Together, Articles I and III thus present two different models for giving effect to specific
enumerations in the Constitution: the enumerations can serve as grants of power (Article
I) or as limitations on grants of power (Article III).
Into which pattern does Article II best fit?

2. Of Cabbages and Kings: Vesting Executive Power
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It is something of an understatement to describe as “settled law” the proposition that section 2
enumerates the full scope of federal court jurisdiction. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,
176 (1803). As a matter of pure textual exegesis, however, that conclusion is not inevitable. We do not
opine here on Marbury’s correctness as a matter of original meaning. For our purposes, nothing turns on
whether the enumerations in Article III, section 2 are exhaustive (and therefore limitations on the judicial
power) or nonexhaustive (and therefore clarifications of the judicial power). In neither case does section 2
function as a grant of power.
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On the one hand, Article II, as does Article III, begins with an unqualified vesting
clause: “The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of
America.” The Article II Vesting Clause does not refer to executive powers “herein
granted,” but seems to follow the Article III formula of granting a general power that
includes, at least as a prima facie matter, whatever powers a fully-informed late
eighteenth-century audience would have understood “executive Power” to include.
On the other hand, sections 2 and 3 of Article II are full of provisions which state
that the President “shall have Power” to perform certain acts. In that respect, sections 2
and 3 seem to resemble Article I, section 8, which grants various powers to Congress.
The “shall have Power” provisions of Article II point towards the view that presidential
power stems from specific enumerations rather than from a general vesting clause. If that
is true, then the Article II Vesting Clause, as with the Article I Vesting Clause, might best
be understood as a designation of office rather than as a grant of power. The Treaty
Clause, as one of the enumerated powers in Article II, section 2, would then best be
understood as a grant of power to both the President and the Senate.
Article II does not precisely follow the form of either Article I or Article III,80 but
on balance the evidence strongly supports the view that the President’s power stems from
the Article II Vesting Clause, with sections 2 and 3 of Article II serving to limit, clarify,
and qualify that basic power grant. This position does not reflect current law or the
weight of scholarly opinion, but it does best reflect the Constitution’s original meaning.
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For an elegant and enlightening discussion of the distinctive features of each of the first three articles,
see Douglas G. Smith, Separation of Powers and the Constitutional Text, 28 N. Ky. L. Rev. 595 (2001)
(detailing the many ways in which the Constitution mixes powers in a way that pure theory would not).
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Put simply: All of the considerations that support reading the Article III Vesting
Clause as a grant of power81 also support a similar reading of the Article II Vesting
Clause. The language of the clause reads as a grant of “executive Power”; dictionary
understandings of the word “vest” reinforce this meaning; other uses of the word “vest”
in the Constitution consistently support a power-granting understanding of the term; and
the parallel formulation in the Article III Vesting Clause further supports the power-grant
reading of the Article II Vesting Clause. There is no “herein granted” language in the
Article II Vesting Clause that might direct one away from this reading. The prima facie
case for construing the Article II Vesting Clause as a grant of power is quite compelling.
Large segments of the legal community disagree. Modern doctrine is in many
crucial respects inconsistent with the view that the Article II Vesting Clause is a grant of
power,82 and a wide range of scholars expressly reject the power-grant reading of the
Article II Vesting Clause.83 Those rejections, however, are often noticeably short on
arguments that are relevant for reasonable-observer originalists.84 We are aware of only
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For a compendium of inconsistencies between the power-grant reading of Article II (and Article III) and
modern law, see Joseph P. Verdon, Note, The Vesting Clauses, The Nixon Test, and the Pharoah’s Dreams,
78 Va. L. Rev. 1253 (1992).
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See, e.g., Flaherty, supra note XX, at 1778; Froomkin, The Imperial President’s New Vestments, supra
note XX, at 1363; Thomas O. McGarity, Presidential Control of Regulatory Agency Decisionmaking, 36
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That is not surprising, as few academicians (or judges) are reasonable-observer originalists. But to the
extent that such scholars are trying to tackle the power-grant reading of the Article II Vesting Clause on the
terms of its proponents, who do tend to be reasonable-observer originalists, the form of the argument
becomes very important.
Professor Froomkin, we suspect, will be surprised to find his extensive discussions of the Article II
Vesting Clause relegated to a footnote. But Professor Froomkin concentrates almost all of his fire on the
analogy between the Article II and Article III Vesting Clauses. We make less of that analogy than did
Professor Calabresi and Kevin Rhodes, to whom Professor Froomkin was directly responding. Professor
Froomkin has relatively little to say about the direct textual arguments that actually formed the foundation
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two comprehensive critiques of the Vesting Clause thesis (as modern scholars generally
call the view that the Article II and Article III Vesting Clauses grant power), and neither
is persuasive.

a. Defending Executive Vestments I (or The President, The
Administration, And The Wardrobe)
An important set of criticisms of the Vesting Clause thesis has come from
Professors Larry Lessig and Cass Sunstein, who defend at some length the claim that the
Article II Vesting Clause “says who has the executive power, not what that power is, just
as the Vesting Clause of Article I says who has the legislative power (a Congress), while
section 8 says what that power is, and the Vesting Clause of Article III says who has the
judicial power (one Supreme Court at least) while section 2 specifies to what that power
‘extends.’ ”85 Professors Lessig and Sunstein offer four distinct arguments against the
Vesting Clause thesis. All four lead nowhere.
The first argument is best labelled “the argument from redundancy”: if the
Vesting Clause grants power, “it would have the effect of rendering superfluous much of
the balance of Article II, since much of the balance of Article II merely articulates what
. . . [the Vesting Clause thesis] would say is implied in the Vesting Clause.”86 The
argument fails for three reasons.
First, as Professors Calabresi and Prakash point out, an interpretation of the
of the Calabresi/Rhodes, Calabresi, and Calabresi/Prakash positions and that form the foundation of our
construction of the vesting clauses here.
85

Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 48
(1994).
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Id. at 49.
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Article II Vesting Clause as a designation of office is even more flagrantly redundant
than is the Vesting Clause thesis; provisions of the Constitution other than the Article II
Vesting Clause consistently refer to a single Chief Executive known as the President,
which renders the Lessig/Sunstein construction of Article II utterly purposeless.87
Second, as Professors Calabresi and Prakash have also responded, it is easy to overstate
the weight of arguments from redundancy in constitutional interpretation.88 That is
especially true when one is discussing redundancy among clauses rather than redundancy
among terms within a clause; arguments from redundancy are much more plausible in the
latter cases.89 Third, Calabresi and Rhodes, echoed by Calabresi and Prakash, try to
explain how at least some of the specific provisions in sections 2 and 3 of Article II do
not simply replicate the “executive Power” granted by the Article II Vesting Clause but
instead limit that executive power in various ways.90 We take that argument one large
step further: we maintain that none of the apparent enumerations of presidential power in
sections 2 and 3 of Article II in fact grant any powers that the President does not
otherwise possess. Instead, they serve to limit, clarify, or qualify the President’s
“executive Power” in order to avoid misconstruction of that power, Congress’s
constitutional powers, or both. Thus, although a number of those provisions are phrased
as grants of power to the President, that is not in fact their constitutional function or
meaning.
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See Calabresi & Prakash, supra note XX, at 576-77.

88
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A prime example is the first sentence of Article II, section 2: “The President shall
be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of
the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States.”91 If the
Article II Vesting Clause grants something called “executive Power” to the President, it
surely grants to the President power to command American military forces as an element
of that “executive Power.” Commanding military forces goes to the very heart of what
chief executives traditionally do. So why would the Constitution then additionally
specify that power if, as we claim, it had already been granted by the Vesting Clause?
The answer is that the Article II (and Article III) strategy of granting a general
power (the “executive Power” or the “judicial Power”) poses dangers of congressional
encroachment on those powers. When powers are not precisely specified, one can expect
the legislative department’s “impetuous vortex”92 to make overreaching efforts to claim
them. This is an especially great danger with respect to the crucial power to direct troop
movements. The Constitution vests considerable power over the military in Congress.
Article I expressly gives to Congress the Power “[t]o declare War, grant Letters of
Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water,”93 “[t]o
raise and support Armies,”94 “[t]o provide and maintain a Navy,”95 “[t]o make Rules for
the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces,”96 “[t]o provide for calling
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The Federalist No. 48, at 309 (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (James Madison).
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forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel
Invasions,”97 and “[t]o provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and
for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United
States.”98 Absent these specific provisions allocating power to Congress, at least some of
these powers arguably might have belonged to the President pursuant to the grant of the
“executive Power.”99 The Constitution clearly takes great pains to make clear that
Congress is an important player in the control of the military. The power to direct troop
movements, of course, is not among the enumerated military powers of Congress. But it
is not difficult to imagine Congress arguing that its impressive enumerated military
powers somehow imply that it also has the power to control the actual operations of the
armed forces. Alternatively, one can imagine Congress claiming that its power to “make
all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution” its otherwiseenumerated congressional powers over the military includes the power of troop direction.
Neither argument is persuasive on its own terms, but it is entirely predictable that
Congress would make such arguments if the Constitution did not prevent it. And if
Congress made those arguments, in the absence of a Commander-in-Chief Clause to
render them frivolous, the country could be plunged into a constitutional confrontation
during times of national crisis. Thus, the Commander-in-Chief Clause functions as an
anti-inference device: it makes absolutely clear that the President’s “executive Power,”
not Congress’s enumerated military powers, contains the power to direct the American
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military. The Commander-in-Chief Clause thus clarifies presidential power in a crucial
area and thereby avoids needless but otherwise likely constitutional conflict.
Similar considerations account for the Opinions Clause, which immediately
follows the Commander-in-Chief Clause in Article II, section 2. That clause states that
the President “may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the
executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective
Offices.” This clause has greatly puzzled constitutional scholars. Why give the President
such a strange power? Doesn’t this clause prove that the President has no general power
to direct the activities of subordinates? And more to the point, doesn’t it prove that the
Article II Vesting Clause could not possibly be a grant of power, because any such grant
of “executive Power” would surely include something as basic as the power to ask
subordinates for written opinions?
Again, however, the Opinions Clause forecloses a predictable, and predictably
damaging, inference that Congress might otherwise seek to draw. All executive offices
except the presidency and the vice presidency are created by statute pursuant to the
Sweeping Clause; the Constitution does not of its own force create any federal agencies
or executive officers. Statutes determine the titles of executive offices, the powers of
executive offices, the salaries of executive offices, and all other properties of executive
offices.100 It is easy to envision Congress specifying that certain executive officials –
such as the Secretary of War or the Secretary of State – must report directly to Congress
and may not report to the President. Perhaps such a statute would not be “necessary and
100

Does that mean that Congress can also determine the tenure of executive offices and thus constrain the
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State, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1231, 1243-45 (1994).

45

proper” under the Sweeping Clause in the absence of the Opinions Clause, but this would
be a very large, and potentially explosive, question to leave to inference. It is entirely
sensible for a constitution to foreclose that argument by making clear that the President
cannot be cut off from communicating with subordinates. The Opinions Clause, as does
the Commander-in-Chief-Clause, thus serves as an anti-inference provision that clarifies
presidential power that is otherwise granted by the Article II Vesting Clause.101
The same can be said of the Pardons Clause, which states that the President “shall
have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United States, except
in Cases of Impeachment.” Surely the “executive Power” includes the pardon power;
that was a traditional aspect of the power of chief executives. But because Congress
defines all federal criminal offenses, there is value in preventing Congress from trying to
use the Sweeping Clause to place certain offenses beyond the pardon power. That is a
particular danger with respect to treason, because the Constitution specifically declares
that “Congress shall have Power to declare the Punishment of Treason.”102 In the
absence of the Pardons Clause, could Congress reason that in order to protect its power to
define the punishment for treason, the President must not be allowed to interfere with the
administration of that punishment through pardons? Any such statute would likely be
unconstitutional even without the Pardons Clause, but again why leave to inference the
resolution of a conflict that is likely to arise in the most heated of settings?
The Pardons Clause also specifies that the President’s pardon power does not
extend to “Cases of Impeachment.” That provision was, strictly speaking, unnecessary,
101
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because impeachment is not a criminal proceeding and therefore could never come within
the pardon power encompassed by the grant of the “executive Power” in the Article II
Vesting Clause. Nonetheless, just as one can readily imagine circumstances in which the
risk of congressional overreaching is high, one can also readily imagine circumstances in
which presidents might be inclined to stretch their powers beyond the breaking point.
Wouldn’t it be tempting for presidents to try to argue that impeachments are analogous
enough to criminal proceedings to come within the pardon power? Why not forestall that
predictable inference, and thus avoid serious constitutional conflict at a time of crisis, by
telling the President up front to back off? The “limitation” on the President’s pardon
power contained in the Pardons Clause is thus not a “limitation” at all, in the sense that it
does not alter the legal world; the President’s pardon power would not extend to
impeachment even if the Pardons Clause contained no such express provision. Rather,
the provision serves an anti-inference function by clarifying an already-existing
limitation on the scope of presidential power.
All three provisions in Article II, section 2, clause 1 thus function as antiinference provisions that clarify rather than grant (or limit) presidential powers. They do
not expand (or contract) the President’s executive power, but rather warn Congress (or
the President) against attempting to encroach (or enlarge) upon that power in predictabe
ways and thus avoid constitutional conflicts on matters of urgent national interest which
are likely to present the highest political stakes.
Article II, section 2, clause 2 contains, in addition to the Treaty Clause, the
Appointments Clause, which provides that the President “shall nominate, and by and with
the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers
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and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States,
whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be
established by Law; but the Congress may be Law vest the Appointment of such inferior
Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the
Heads of Departments.”103 The appointment power certainly seems like an aspect of the
“executive Power” that the President would gain from the Article II Vesting Clause if that
clause is indeed a grant of power, at least in the absence of constitutional specification to
the contrary.104 The Appointments Clause, however, significantly limits and qualifies the
President’s appointment power. The Congress is granted a crucial role in determining
which inferior officers can be appointed by persons other than the President; the heads of
executive departments and the federal courts are granted power to make certain
appointments if Congress so specifies; and the Senate is granted a crucial role in the
appointment process for principal officers and for all inferior officers whose mode of
appointment does not specifically exclude the Senate. Thus, the Appointments Clause
functions as a grant of power to Congress, the Senate, executive department heads, and
the federal courts. It is a limitation on presidential power in the form of a grant of power
to other actors.105 It is not a grant of power to the President.
The Recess Appointment Clause, which says that the President “shall have Power
to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting
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Commissions which shall expire at the End of their next Session,”106 is necessitated by
the grant of appointment power to the Senate in the Appointments Clause. Some
provision had to be made for appointments when the Senate was not available to
complete them. The Recess Appointments Clause thus serves essentially as a limitation
on presidential appointment power during periods of senatorial recess.
Section 3 of Article II contains a series of provisions concerning presidential
power, many of which are phrased as duties rather than powers. The President “shall
from time to time give to the Congress Information of the State of the Union, and
recommend to their Consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary and
expedient.”107 These are obligations imposed upon the President rather than powers
granted to him and thus cannot even in principle implicate the status of the Article II
Vesting Clause as a grant of power.
The next provision of section 3 is phrased as a grant of power: “he may, on
extraordinary Occasions, convene both Houses, or either of them, and in Case of
Disagreement between them, with Respect to the Time of Adjournment, he may adjourn
them to such Time as he shall think proper.”108 This provision, however, functions as a
limitation on presidential power. A bare grant of the “executive Power” would at least
arguably grant the President broad power to adjourn the legislature109; this clause
confines that power to a narrowly defined scope.

106

U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 3.

107

Id. art. II, § 3.

108

Id.

109

See Smith, supra note XX, at 608-09.

49

The final three provisions of Article II, section 3 are formulated a bit more
ambiguously than some of the others: “he shall receive Ambassadors and other public
Ministers; he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed, and shall Commission
all the Officers of the United States.”110 Although the word “shall” can sometimes
signify a grant of power, the context of at least the last two of these provisions suggests
the imposition of duties more naturally than it does the grant of powers. That is clearest
in the case of the Take Care Clause. English monarchs had occasionally claimed the
power to suspend laws by refusing to enforce them. It thus makes very good sense for a
presidential power of law execution granted by the Vesting Clause to be cabined by the
Take Care Clause – the President does not have absolute discretion with respect to law
execution but must exercise that power faithfully. The Take Care Clause thus neatly
eliminates any possible presidential claim to a royal power of suspension.111 The
Commissions Clause similarly reads most naturally as a duty – as a certain Secretary of
State and would-be Justice of the Peace once taught us.
The Receipt of Ambassadors Clause, however, simply does not make sense as a
duty. To say that the President “shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers”
leaves open a great many questions: Exactly who counts as a legitimate foreign emissary?
On what terms will such emissaries be received? Which functionaries are appropriate
stand-ins for the President? The clause makes sense only if it reads as though the
President “shall [be the person who bears responsibility to] receive Ambassadors and
other public Ministers.” As with the provisions in Article II, section 2, this clause thus
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avoids potential conflict with Congress over who bears primary diplomatic responsibility.
The “executive Power” is a natural home for both the ceremonial and substantive
functions involved in receiving foreign emissaries, but one can imagine Congress
claiming the right to, for example, determine who to recognize as a legitimate foreign
emissary as an incident to its powers to regulate foreign commerce or declare war.
Dispute about such matters could prove eminently embarrassing, so it is eminently
sensible to foreclose the prospect of conflict.
It is thus possible to integrate all of the provisions of Article II into a unified
theory of Article II that is anchored by the Vesting Clause thesis. To anticipate an
obvious objection to the foregoing account: no, we do not maintain that the available
historical records show clear expressions of intent on the part of the framers to construct
Article II as we have presented it. There is nothing in the drafting history of the
Constitution that points inexorably (or even feebly) towards all of the constructions that
we have placed upon the various provisions concerning the President. We have instead
produced an idealized reconstruction of Article II that harmonizes the provisions with
certain fundamental principles derived from the Constitution’s overall text and structure,
most notably the Vesting Clause thesis which is compelled, at least as a prima facie
matter, by the textual, intratextual, and structural features of the Constitution’s use of the
terms “vest” and “vested.” That is, we submit, exactly the right way to discern the
meaning of Article II. After all, we are not arguing that the text and structure of sections
2 and 3 of Article II affirmatively mandate the Vesting Clause thesis; we are arguing
merely that those provisions do not provide a compelling reason to abandon the Vesting
Clause thesis that is derived from other considerations. Understood from the perspective
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of an ideal observer who has already acknowledged the potent prima facie case for the
Vesting Clause thesis, the provisions in sections 2 and 3 of Article II other than the
Treaty Clause appear most plausibly as duties imposed on the President, clarifications of
presidential power that forestall constitutional conflicts, or qualifications or limitations on
presidential power. Some of these provisions grant power to non-presidential actors, but
none grant power to the President. Nothing in sections 2 and 3 of Article II casts doubt
on the status of the Article II Vesting Clause as a grant of the “executive Power” to the
President.112 Accordingly, even if one was inclined to question the Vesting Clause thesis
if it generated extreme redundancy, the structure of Article II does not exhibit such
redundancy.
The second argument against the Vesting Clause thesis advanced by Professors
Lessig and Sunstein can be labelled “the argument from the Hamilton that didn’t bark in
the night.” In a series of essays in The Federalist, Alexander Hamilton discussed the
constitutional powers of the President.113 He never mentioned the Article II Vesting
Clause among those powers. Thus, “not even Hamilton described the Vesting Clause as
an independent source of substantive executive power, though he was in general quite
eager to define a strong executive. In his catalog of the executive powers, contrasting the
American executive with the British monarch, nowhere does he discuss a general
executive power arising from the Vesting Clause.”114 If even someone as disposed
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towards broad executive power as Alexander Hamilton did not recognize the Article II
Vesting Clause as a power grant, how are we to do so?
Professors Calabresi and Prakash have responded that Hamilton, whatever his
personal beliefs may have been, was unlikely to trumpet a broad presidential power in a
document that was designed to defuse Antifederalist criticism of the Constitution.115
They are exactly right. The Federalist was campaign literature, and it needs to be viewed
as such. Unlike modern campaign literature, it occasionally contains some very profound
observations about human nature, governmental structure, and the workings of the
Constitution, but one must tread carefully when using it as an interpretative guide.
Third, Professors Lessig and Sunstein make what we somewhat teasingly call “the
argument from Illinois.” They claim that “while the federal constitution certainly
constituted a more unitary executive than most state constitutions, the same language
vesting executive power in state constitutions had been understood at the time of the
framing not to mark an inherent power, but to describe an authority limited to that power
enumerated. At least as a presumption, similar language in the federal constitution would
suggest a similar understanding.”116 So phrased, this looks like a very sensible argument.
If founding-era state constitutions actually used executive vesting clauses as designations
of office rather than as grants of power, that would be relevant evidence concerning the
meaning of the Article II Vesting Clause.

115

Calabresi & Prakash, supra note XX, at 612.

116

Lessig & Sunstein, supra note XX, at 49-50.

53

Unfortunately for Professors Lessig and Sunstein, the only example of such a
constitution that they can muster comes from an 1839 Illinois Supreme Court decision117
construing the executive vesting clause of the 1818 Illinois constitution.118 That case did
indeed hold that the Illinois constitution’s executive vesting clause did not grant any
power to the Illinois governor, and in particular did not grant the power to remove at will
the Illinois Secretary of State. But 1839 is, by our count, fifty-one years after the
ratification of the federal Constitution.119 As evidence of the original meaning of the
Federal Constitution of 1788, this leaves something to be desired.120
More to the point, a broader study of state constitutions that really were from the
founding era provides support for the Vesting Clause thesis. Such a study of state
constitutions from 1776-77 has been conducted by Lance Miller,121 and it discloses that
the text and structure of these constitutions, as well as the practices of state governments
under them, tends to support the view that founding-era executive vesting clauses were,
at least some of time, grants of executive power. For instance, some of those early
constitutions, after describing specific powers of the chief executive, have vesting clauses
that refer to “all other executive powers” or “all the other executive powers of
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government.”122 As Mr. Miller ably concludes, “[b]y vesting ‘all other’ executive
powers in the executive, the framers of these early constitutions indicated an
understanding that the listed powers granted [to] the governors are part of a larger class
of ‘executive powers.’ ”123 These early constitutions are thus precedents for grants of
general executive powers to chief magistrates. Moreover, various executives under these
first constitutions “acted to seize property, change a state capital, and authorize payments,
all under authority not specifically iterated under their respective constitutions.”124 These
actions, which were not challenged on constitutional grounds, make sense only if the
relevant vesting clauses granted these governors a general executive power. The overall
lesson to be drawn from Mr. Miller’s study is that “while the early framers were
protective against executive tyranny, the safeguards they instituted in their constitutions
did not come in the form of a refusal to vest executive powers.”125 Instead, they
employed plural executives and elaborately specified restrictions on the exercise of
executive power. There is, of course, some distance between state constitutions of 177677 and the federal Constitution of 1788-89, but the distance is far less than the gap
between the federal Constitution and an 1839 Illinois Supreme Court decision.
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Professors Lessig and Sunstein had the right idea, but they looked at the wrong evidence
and reached the wrong conclusion.126
The final argument from Professors Lessig and Sunstein can be called the “doyou-really-want-to-go-there? argument.” Drawing on the parallels often drawn by
advocates of the Vesting Clause thesis between the Article II and Article III Vesting
Clauses, Professors Lessig and Sunstein ask: “If the difference between Article II and
Article I entails broad inherent power in the President, does it entail the same broad grant
of inherent power in Article III? For just like Article II, and unlike Article I, Article III
vests ‘[t]he judicial power’ (and not just the judicial power ‘herein granted’) in ‘the
Supreme Court.’ But does this mean that the judicial branch has a wide range of inherent
and (legislatively) unregulable judicial authority beyond that enumerated and granted by
Congress, drawn from English practice?”127 The subtext of this passage is fairly clear.
Advocates of the Vesting Clause thesis tend, on the whole, to favor what one might
loosely call “judicial restraint,” though that term is notoriously difficult to pin down.128

126

Professors Bradley and Flaherty appear to draw somewhat different conclusions than did Mr. Miller
from these early state constitutions. See Bradley & Flaherty, supra note XX, at 571-85. But while they
very successfully show that early state constitutions were generally distrustful of executive authority, they
are much less successful in showing that executive vesting clauses in those constitutions were designations
of office rather than grants of (perhaps minimal) executive authority. At times, they seem to assume that
vesting clauses followed by specific identifications of power cannot be grants of power and thus defeat the
Vesting Clause thesis, see id. at 579-80, but that is simply a strong form of an unpersuasive argument from
redundancy. At other times, they appear to acknowledge that early vesting clauses indeed granted power,
albeit power that was strictly limited and cabined. See id. at 579-80 (“to the extent these general executive
power provisions conveyed anything, they conveyed no more than a general power of implementing and
enforcing the laws.”); id. at 580 (“General language was used to delegate only the power to implement the
laws”). If such clauses conveyed any power at all, they provide general support for the Vesting Clause
thesis as we present it. This discussion exemplifies the tendency of Professors Bradley and Flaherty to
equivocate between different meanings of the term “Vesting Clause thesis.” See infra XX. And at no time
do Professors Bradley and Flaherty consider the actual exercises of power undertaken by early state
governors.
127

Lessig & Sunstein, supra note XX, at 50.

128

For a brief overview of the confusion, see Gary Lawson, Conservative or Constitutionalist?, 1 Geo.
J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 81 (2002).

56

But if the Article III Vesting Clause is, as proponents of the Vesting Clause thesis claim,
an independent grant of power to the federal courts, what might those powers be?
Couldn’t they include many things that make advocates of the Vesting Clause thesis
recoil in horror? Does the quest for the Unitary Executive lead instead to the Imperial
Judiciary?
The answer is that the Vesting Clause thesis does indeed mean that the
Constitution grants to the federal judiciary “a wide range of inherent and (legislatively)
unregulable judicial authority beyond that enumerated and granted by Congress.” Put
simply, the Constitution gives the federal courts power to decide cases in accordance with
governing law. The courts do not get that power of decisionmaking from Congress. One
of us has described at considerable length how far (at least he believes that) this
unregulable judicial authority goes.129 It includes (or so Professor Lawson believes), for
example, power to fashion rules of evidence and other principles of decisionmaking free
from legislative control. But that power is not unlimited. It extends only to those matters
which concern the decisionmaking process of the federal judiciary. That is not a trivial
set of concerns, but it does not make the federal courts all-powerful. The grant of power
in Article III, after all, is a grant of “judicial Power,” not a grant of all possible power.
The general nature of the grant does not make it an unlimited grant. In other words, if
Professors Lessig and Sunstein want to try to discredit the Vesting Clause thesis with
claims about its implications for the power of the federal courts, we say: “Bring it on!”
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b. Defending Executive Vestments II (or Executive Power
Existentialism and Foreign Affairs)
Professors Curtis Bradley and Martin Flaherty have recently entered the debate
with a lengthy attack on the Vesting Clause thesis.130 Their argument is difficult to
summarize for two reasons. First, it spans 144 law review pages. Second, and more
importantly, it is not clear precisely what version of the Vesting Clause thesis Professors
Bradley and Flaherty mean to attack. Their argument was prompted by the argument of
Professors Sai Prakash and Michael Ramsey that the Article II Vesting Clause grants to
the President a specific package of powers over foreign affairs that includes such things
as the power to recall ambassadors, to communicate with foreign governments, and to
terminate treaties.131 The Prakash/Ramsey position entails two distinct claims: that the
Article II Vesting Clause grants to the President a set of powers called the “executive
Power,” and that such powers include certain specific foreign affairs powers. If the first
claim is false, the second is false as well, but the first claim can be true even if the second
is false. The content of the “executive Power” granted to the President by the Vesting
Clause is an issue separate from whether the Article II Vesting Clause grants power. It is
frequently unclear to which of these claims Professors Bradley and Flaherty are trying to
respond, but it seems as though they are primarily concerned with the more specific claim
that the Vesting Clause grants certain foreign affairs powers. Indeed, some of their most
powerful arguments involve pointing out that evidenced mustered by Professors Prakash
and Ramsey supports only the general proposition that the Article II Vesting Clause
130

Bradley & Flaherty, supra note XX.

131

See Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, 111
Yale L.J. 231 (2000).

58

grants some power, such as a power to execute the laws, but not more precise
propositions about foreign affairs powers.132
But while the vast bulk of their argument clearly targets something that is best
labeled the “Foreign Affairs Vesting thesis” rather than the “Vesting Clause thesis,”
Professors Bradley and Flaherty do put forward a case against the more general Vesting
Clause thesis that we advance here. We are unmoved.
Many parts of the Bradley/Flaherty critique of the Vesting Clause thesis are
familiar. They suggest, as have others before them, that the use of the “herein granted”
language in the Article I Vesting Clause but not in the Article II or Article III Vesting
Clauses may have been the product of a drafting accident rather than conscious design.133
That may be true, but it does not affect the meaning of the Constitution from the
perspective of reasonable-observer originalism, which is concerned with how the
Constitution’s language would be publicly perceived by a reaonable observer rather than
with the motivations behind that language. Moreover, it misunderstands the role of the
“herein granted” language, which is hardly “the principal textual argument”134 in support
of the Vesting Clause thesis. The principal textual argument is the text of the Article II
and Article III Vesting Clauses and the other constitutional provisions that use the words
“vest” and “vested,” which seem on their faces to be grants of power. The “herein
granted” language in Article I highlights the fact that the Article II and Article III Vesting
Clauses do not expressly direct one outside those clauses for definitions of the powers of
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the President and the federal courts, but that language does not anchor the argument for
the Vesting Clause thesis.
Professors Bradley and Flaherty also advance at some length the argument from
redundancy, emphasizing that past defenders of the Vesting Clause thesis have not
provided convincing explanations for all of the specific enumerations in sections 2 and 3
of Article II.135 We have addressed that argument at length already.136 They further
suggest that general grants of executive (and, one presumes, judicial) authority, such as
those claimed by the Vesting Clause thesis, are “at least in tension with the enumerated
powers structure of the Constitution,”137 but power-granting vesting clauses in fact
enumerate powers. There may be a good case against construing those general powers
broadly, but not against construing them as powers. And Professors Bradley and
Flaherty also offer a (somewhat meandering) argument based on the comparison between
Article II and Article III, which eventually culminates in a claim about the scope of the
power granted by the Article II Vesting Clause rather than a claim about the Vesting
Clause thesis in its most general form.138
Overhanging the entire Bradley/Flaherty argument are two methodological
puzzles. Professors Bradley and Flaherty do not claim decisively to have defeated the
Vesting Clause thesis on the basis of text and structure. Rather, they advance their
textual and structural arguments in order to show that the “textual arguments in support
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of the Vesting Clause Thesis are, at best, indeterminate,”139 and that “the legitimacy of
the Vesting Clause Thesis cannot be determined simply by looking at what the
Constitution says.”140 The first puzzle is figuring out what they mean by
“indeterminate.” If they mean that the Vesting Clause thesis cannot be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt, they have a point – albeit a point that renders “indeterminate” virtually
every interesting question in constitutional law from the perspective of virtually every
interpretative approach that one can imagine. If instead they mean that one cannot, using
arguments from text and structure, evaluate the relative plausibility of the Vesting Clause
thesis compared to other interpretations of the vesting clauses, they are just wrong.
This leads to the second methodological puzzle. Professors Bradley and Flaherty
are very quick to give up on textual and structural arguments and pronounce them
indeterminate. It sometimes seems as though they regard the conceivability of alternative
interpretations as grounds for existentialist-like despair about the utility of textual and
structural reasoning. This contrasts sharply with their sophisticated, detailed, and
painstaking parsing of historical materials, which displays a keen sensitivity to sometimes
subtle differences in interpretations of such materials. In our view, the expenditure of
energy should be allocated in precisely the opposite fashion. One should direct primary
attention to sophisticated, detailed, and painstaking scrutiny of textual and structural
arguments and turn to history only as a last resort. With the expenditure of some energy,
the textual and structural arguments in favor of the Vesting Clause thesis emerge as
considerably stronger than Professors Bradley and Flaherty seem willing to credit – and
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certainly as stronger than any alternative construction of the Vesting Clauses. That is
enough to let argument go forward.

c. Tailoring Executive Vestments

In the end, the case for a power-grant reading of the Article II Vesting Clause is
very strong. The primary question raised by the Article II Vesting Clause is not whether
it grants power to the President but rather what kind of power it grants. What is the scope
of the “executive Power” that is vested in the President by Article II? That is an
enormous question that we cannot pursue here in depth. For now, we must be content
with several preliminary observations, some of which we have foreshadowed and some
of which we will shortly elaborate.
First, a general power is not an unlimited power. Any power claimed by the
President under the Article II Vesting Clause must fall within a late eighteenth-century
understanding of “executive Power” in the aftermath of an anti-monarchical revolution.
There are many imaginable assertions of presidential power that fail the laugh test under
this standard, such as the power to take over steel mills,141 to halt pending judicial
proceedings,142 and to make law under the guise of “interpretation.”143 The “executive
Power” granted by the Vesting Clause is not the royal prerogative. It is not necessarily a
very large power at all.
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Second, the term “executive Power” clearly did not have a single, well-defined,
universally understood meaning in the founding era; that much has been more than amply
demonstrated by Professors Bradley and Flaherty.144 That does not establish, however,
that the term was empty or meaningless; “[a] term need not be precisely determinate in
order to have meaningful content.”145
Third, the core meaning of “executive Power” is the power to execute federal
laws.146 This power is not merely the power mechanistically to follow congressional
commands, but also includes elements of discretion in enforcement policy, interpretation
of ambiguous statutes (up to a point), and what can best be described as the setting of
administrative policy.147
Fourth, and more controversially, the “executive Power” also includes foreign
affairs powers that are not otherwise allocated to specific institutions by the Constitution.
According to Professors Prakash and Ramsey, these powers include such things as the
power to direct troop movements, to communicate with foreign nations, to recall
ambassadors, to enter into executive agreements, and probably to terminate treaties.
Professors Bradley and Flaherty, of course, vigorously contest all of these claims. We
are not prepared to say that Professors Prakash and Ramsey are right about every single
power that they claim for the President under the Article II Vesting Clause.148 But we do
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believe that at least some powers that can loosely be labeled “foreign affairs powers” are
encompassed by the Article II Vesting Clause. At the risk of engaging a 144-page
discussion in a few sentences: It does not suffice to say, as Professors Bradley and
Flaherty convincingly say, that “executive Power” was a messy, contested concept in the
late eighteenth century. That does not foreclose a best reading of the concept in specific
circumstances. Nor does it suffice to say, as Professors Bradley and Flaherty
convincingly say, that available founding-era records do not yield extensive discussions
that specifically mention the “executive Power” in Article II as a locus of foreign affairs
powers. Originalist arguments that focus on public meaning, and particularly the
reasonable-observer originalism that we employ, operate on a higher level of conceptual
generality than Professors Bradley and Flaherty address. And that brings us to the
principal point: For reasonable-observer originalists, the central insight of the
Prakash/Ramsey argument is one which Professors Bradley and Flaherty do not really
engage149: Whatever some pure theory might or might not say about the allocation of
foreign affairs powers, the federal Constitution, which adopts the strategy of enumerating
the powers of federal institutions, specifically grants to Congress something less than the
full range of traditional foreign affairs powers and then grants “executive Power” to the
President. Either the grant of the “executive Power” includes some of these traditional
foreign affairs powers that are not granted to Congress (with room for argument about
exactly which ones are included) or the Constitution fails to grant those powers to any
149

This is not a criticism of Professors Bradley and Flaherty; it is simply an observation. They are not
reasonable-observer originalists. They were responding to an article that was not written from the
perspective of reasonable-observer originalism (though at least some of that article is consistent with such
an approach). Professors Prakash and Ramsey made some strong claims about historical materials, so it is
only reasonable for Professors Bradley and Flaherty to respond in kind. Our concern is that their
understandable focus on the historical claims has diverted attention from the more basic textual and
structural claims to which historical argument is appropriately the handmaiden.

64

federal institution. Perhaps the Constitution is a major botch-job which left many of
those powers ungranted. But while we are perhaps more willing than are Professors
Prakash and Ramsey to indulge the possibility that some foreign affairs powers slipped
through the constitutional cracks and therefore cannot be claimed by any federal
institution, we suspect that a fully-informed reasonable observer would be loathe to reach
that conclusion with respect to all otherwise expressly unallocated foreign affairs powers
when a sensible alternative is at hand.
The Article II Vesting Clause grants “executive Power” to the President. That
does not make the President the King. Nor does it make the President a cipher. The truth
lies in between.

B. Location, Location, Location: The Article II Treaty Clause

In a portion of the Constitution, such as Article I, in which the Vesting Clause
confers no power, the specific enumerations that follow that clause clearly represent
grants of power that define the powers “herein granted” that belong to Congress.150
Article I enumerations are grants of power. In portions of the Constitution such as
Articles II and III, however, in which the first sentence confers a general power,
subsequent enumerations serve very different functions. They do not grant power to the
principal subjects of their respective Articles, but instead clarify, qualify, or limit the
150
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basic power grants in the vesting clauses. They sometimes grant power to to other actors,
but not to the actors that receive power from the vesting clauses.
The Treaty Clause appears in the middle of Article II, section 2. If it follows the
general pattern of Article II enumerations, and there is no evident reason for an observer
to suppose that it does not, then the Treaty Clause is not a grant of power to the
President. It is a limitation, by way of requiring Senate consent, on a presidential power
that is otherwise granted by the Article II Vesting Clause. It grants power to the Senate
that that body would not otherwise have, but it does not create a federal treaty power that
would not exist in the clause’s absence. Without the Treaty Clause, the President would
have the sole power of making treaties as an aspect of the “executive Power.”
This conclusion, while firmly grounded in constitutional structure, is not as
straightforward as we have made it out to be. The drafting history of the Treaty Clause
does not reveal a conscious consensus to place the clause in the middle of Article II in
order to cement its executive pedigree; the drafting process was considerably messier
than that.151 Although the treaty power in the late eighteenth century, consistently with
its Article II placement, “would historically have been understood as part of the executive
power,”152 a number of prominent founding-era figures, including some prominent
Framers, expressed the view that the treaty-making power was legislative, or at least was
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not clearly executive.153 Third, as David Golove has forcefully argued,154 the eighteenthcentury historical conception of treaty making as an executive function may have rested
on a view of executive sovereignty that does not necessarily fit the American
Constitution very well. Accordingly, a hypothetical, fully-informed eighteenth-century
audience may have been quite open to the possibility that the treaty-making power under
the American system of government is best viewed as legislative rather than executive.
But while these considerations might be enough to establish that a treaty clause
located among legislative powers in Article I should not be regarded as executive, it is
very hard to see how they permit a treaty clause located in the middle of Article II to be
viewed by an informed public as reflecting anything other than executive power. As
Professor John Norton Moore has elegantly put it
It is possible to debate theoretically whether the power to make treaties is
primarily executive or legislative, as did Hamilton and Madison in the famous
"Pacificus-Helvidius" exchange. Under the Constitution of the United States,
however, there can be but one answer. For the treaty power is placed in Article II,
under the Executive, with a check in the Senate. It was not placed in Article I,
under the Legislative branch, with a check in the Executive. The starting point for
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analysis under the United States Constitution, then, is that the treaty power is
primarily executive in its nature.155
As a result of the location of the Treaty Clause, one of the “obvious” insights that
emerges from a cursory examination of the constitutional text--that the Treaty Clause is a
grant of power to the President and Senate--is false, at least as applied to the President.156
Clauses that speak of granted power do not have the same meaning in Article II that they
have in Article I. Article II enumerations of “power” are not grants of power to the
President that otherwise would not exist, but instead are clarifications or qualifications of
powers that are otherwise part of the “executive Power.” The treaty power, as befitting
its location in the middle of Article II of the Constitution, is an aspect of the “executive
Power,” distinguished from other aspects of the executive power by the requirement of
consent by two thirds of the Senate.
Accordingly, the Treaty Clause, although phrased as an enumeration of power, is
in reality a constraint on the President’s executive power. Alexander Hamilton thus aptly
described the Treaty Clause when he remarked in his defense of the Neutrality
Proclamation that “the participation of the senate in the making of Treaties and the power
of the Legislature to declare war are exceptions out of the general ‘Executive Power’
vested in the President”157 To be sure, Hamilton in The Federalist, while he was trying to
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sell the Constitution to New Yorkers skeptical of broad presidential power, expressly
disclaimed the executive character of the treaty power.158 As has been frequently
observed, consistency was not always the Framers’ hallmark--which is yet another reason
to focus on what the Constitution says rather than on what people said that is says.

C. The Limits of Executive Power: Implementation and Reasonableness

The identification of the treaty power as an aspect of the “executive Power” has
important substantive consequences. The “executive Power” granted to the President is
not boundless. Nor does the dearth of express textual limitations on that power suggest a
broad scope for presidential power. Quite to the contrary, Article II did not need to
enumerate the range of cases to which the “executive Power” extends in order to limit
that power because the very nature of the executive power defines its limits.

1. Execution as Implementation

The essence of the executive power is to execute, or carry into effect, national
laws.159 These laws include the Constitution, statutes, treaties, judicial judgments, and
the common law of the United States to the extent that such a body of law exists, subject
to the President’s paramount obligation to the Constitution. But the “executive Power,”
158
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in the course of carrying out its essential function, can only execute laws that already
exist independently of the exercise of federal executive power. That execution, of course,
can include interpretation of the laws and hence is not a purely ministerial function. It
also includes a strong element of discretion in the selection of the means, forms, and
priorities for execution--which collectively we might call the setting of administrative
policy. But all of this discretion must be exercised within the confines of ends
established by pre-existing law. If the laws in question leave too much to the
imagination, their “interpretation” would in fact be the creation rather than the execution
of the law and would therefore exceed the President’s executive power.160 Accordingly,
the grant to the President of the “executive Power” is self-limiting. It is a grant of power
to carry into effect other law.
We can now understand, intratextually, why the Article II Vesting Clause, unlike
the Article I Sweeping Clause, does not expressly say, “The executive Power to take all
Actions which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the Laws of the
United States shall be vested in a President.” The “for carrying into Execution” proviso
did not need to be textually specified in the Article II Vesting Clause because it is
inherent in the very concept of “executive Power” as the Constitution uses that term.
(We will later demonstrate that the “necessary and proper” requirement is also implicit in
the grant of the executive power.) It is the nature of the President’s “executive Power” to
implement existing law, not to create new law. The “executive Power,” despite its
textually unqualified nature, is an implementational power.
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That also explains how the federal treaty power can be implementational even
though the Treaty Clause does not contain the kind of language found in the Sweeping
Clause. The grant to the President of the “executive Power,” at least in its fundamental
function of executing the laws, carries with it, by its very nature, a requirement that it be
used only for carrying into execution federal law. No textual limitation to that effect was
necessary. Executive power and legislative power are different enough in character to
require different forms of limitation; one would not expect grants of legislative power to
be textually limited in precisely the same manner as grants of executive power. To the
extent that the treaty power is part of the “executive Power” granted by the Vesting
Clause, one similarly would not expect the same kinds of textual limitations that one
finds on legislative power.
At least, that is true of the “executive Power” in its “essential meaning” of
executing the laws of the United States. There is more to the executive power than that.
How much more is a matter of considerable controversy, which we cannot hope to
address here. It suffices to say that the Constitution’s vesting of “all legislative Powers
herein granted” in Congress, and its creation of a judiciary department separate from the
executive, counsels in favor of a relatively narrow understanding of the scope of the
executive power.161 It is hard to dispute, however, that the Article II Vesting Clause
confers, in addition to the power to execute the laws of the United States, a certain degree
of federative, or foreign affairs, powers not otherwise allocated to any federal institution
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that involve a significant degree of policymaking.162 These powers do not simply carry
into effect the ends set by other governmental actors; they constitute an independent head
of jurisdiction vested in the President. But they only grant jurisdiction of a limited kind.
Most importantly, these general foreign affairs powers typically are not lawmaking
powers; they do not permit the President unilaterally to impose rights and obligations on
citizens.163 Rather, these powers concern such matters as communication with foreign
nations and the recall of ambassadors.
Some presidential foreign affairs powers, however, do have the potential to affect
private rights. If Professors Prakash and Ramsey are right that the President has the
“executive Power” to terminate treaties (and we are officially agnostic on that point),
private rights relating to the terminated treaties can be at stake. And to the extent that the
President has the power to employ military force, that action has quite significant
consequences for the forces under his command, if not for the country at large. Most
significantly for our purposes, as we have discussed at length in a previous article, the
President may act as a lawmaker with respect to occupied foreign territory during
wartime.164 As “legisecutive” powers go, this one is about as “legis” as one can get. It is
limited, however, to occupied foreign territory during wartime and provides no basis for
exercising jurisdiction over American citizens in American territory. But it is
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unquestionably a significant grant of power to the President. Thus, while the bulk of the
powers granted to the President by the Article II Vesting Clause are limited to the
implementation of ends set by other legal actors, some of those powers are best
understood as independent heads of jurisdiction.
Given the dual aspect of the Article II Vesting Clause, which contains both
implementational and jurisdiction-granting elements, how would one determine the
proper scope of the treaty power? Does the Treaty Clause partake solely of the
implementational aspect of the executive power or does it also constitute a unique kind of
jurisdiction-extending lawmaking instrument?
Before we finalize our answer to that question, we need to flesh out more fully
what it would mean for the treaty power to be implementational. In particular, we need
to understand precisely what limitations the implementational view reads into the Treaty
Clause by virtue of its Article II location. And that requires a 500-year detour.

2. The Principle of Reasonableness

We are contending that the Treaty Clause is analogous to the Sweeping Clause: it
exists in order to effectuate other enumerated powers of federal institutions. The
Sweeping Clause specifically limits its grant of power to laws “for carrying into
Execution” federal powers. We have already explained why the absence of such
language in the Article II Treaty Clause can be consistent with an implementational view
of that clause: if the treaty power is an aspect of the more general Article II “executive
Power,” its implementational character follows as a matter of course. The Sweeping
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Clause, however, contains a substantive textual limitation in addition to the requirement
that it be used only “for carrying into Execution” constitutionally granted powers. Laws
enacted pursuant to the Sweeping Clause must be “necessary and proper” for their
implementational purpose. One of us has spent a fair portion of his professional life
plumbing the meaning of the word “proper” and has concluded that it requires executory
legislation to conform to constitutional principles of federalism, separation of powers,
and individual rights.165 Of course, the better-known term, because of its prominence in
McCulloch v Maryland, is “necessary,” which denotes a causal, or telic,166 relationship
between the means employed and the ends served. The Sweeping Clause requires a
certain degree of “fit” between means and ends.167 Can one similarly derive some kind of
“necessary and proper” requirement for the treaty power from inference?
In order to answer this question, one needs to examine at length some eighteenthcentury background principles about delegated power. All of the powers in the
Constitution are delegations from the ultimate source of law. Many of these grants of
power unavoidably involve the exercise of discretion by public officials. It was well
understood in eighteenth-century English law that grants from Parliament of discretionary
governmental authority carried the implied provision that exercises of discretion had to
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be reasonable.168 The principle is often traced back to Rooke’s Case in 1598.169 A statute
from the reign of Henry VIII in 1531 gave to sewer commissioners the power to
determine needed repairs to water-control measures “as case shall require, after your
wisdoms and discretions” and the power to assess landowners for the costs of
maintenance and repairs as the commissioners “shall deem most convenient to be
ordained.” 170 The Commissioners of Sewers under this statute171 had assessed on one
landowner the full costs of a repair to a bank of the Thames, even though “divers other
persons had lands to the quantity of 800 acres within the same level, and subject to
drowning, if the said bank is not repaired . . . .”172 The court, through Sir Edward Coke,
upheld the landowner’s challenge to the assessment. An adequate ground for the decision
was probably language in the 1427 predecessor to the statute making clear that “no
tenants of land or tenements . . . shall in any way be spared in this,”173 but Lord Coke
nonetheless added in dictum:
Notwithstanding the words of the commission give authority to the
commissioners to do according to their discretions, yet their proceedings ought to
be limited and bound with the rule of reason and law. For discretion is a science
or understanding to discern between falsity and truth, between wrong and right,
between shadows and substance, between equity and colourable glosses and
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pretences, and not to do according to their wills and private affections; for as one
saith, talis discretion discretionem confundit.174
This dictum was very influential in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. A
similar sentiment was often repeated in seventeenth-century cases,175 and in 1773 it was
restated by the court in Leader v Moxon.176 A statute gave paving commissioners power
to pave and repair streets “ ‘in such a manner as the commissioners shall think fit.’ ” The
court (one of whose judges was William Blackstone) nonetheless awarded damages when
the commissioners ordered part of a street raised so high that it obstructed the plaintiff’s
doors and windows, because “the commissioners had grossly exceeded their powers,
which must have a reasonable construction. Their discretion is not arbitrary, but must be
limited by reason and law.”177

As the court explained, “the act could never intend that

any of the householders should pay a rate of 1s. 6d. in the pound in order to have their
houses buried under ground, and their windows and doors obstructed . . . . [H]ad
Parliament intended to demolish or render useless some houses for the benefit or
ornament of the rest, it would have given express powers for that purpose, and given an
equivalent for the loss that individuals might have sustained thereby.”178
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In England, the statement from Rooke’s Case “has lost nothing of its accuracy in
over 400 years”179; the principle of reasonableness remains one of the bedrocks of
English administrative law.
The principle of reasonableness in the exercise of delegated discretionary power
is a common law principle that the eighteenth-century colonists would have found very
congenial given its rights-protective and anti-monarchical character. But what could this
principle mean operationally in the context of the powers delegated under the American
Constitution?
In England before the founding, delegated power effectively meant executive
power (which included what we now think of as judicial power). The quintessential case
of discretion pertained to the choice of means for carrying out ends established by
Parliament. In that context, discretion can be limited from at least three important
directions. First, one can say that the delegatee’s choice of means must be measured, in
the sense of reasonably proportionate to the end sought. One does not burn down a
village to kill a fox--or, perhaps more to the point, one does not ordinarily fix a road by
destroying a house when less destructive alternatives are available. Continental lawyers
have raised this notion of proportionality to the level of high principle, refining it and
using it to require a relatively precise fit between means and ends that approximates the
“least restrictive alternative” analysis familiar to First Amendment lawyers.180 English
law has never recognized this “principle of proportionality” as a distinct legal
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requirement.181 It certainly was not a part of English law in the eighteenth century, if
only because the principle was developed in Germany in the nineteenth century.182
Nonetheless, it is not difficult to see elements of proportionality (though not the fully
refined continental principle) in the traditional common law concept of reasonableness;
“the principles of reasonableness and proportionality cover a great deal of common
ground.”183 It is very natural to describe a decision as “unreasonable” if the means are
grossly disproportionate to the ends, and many English decisions, including Leader v
Moxon, are consistent with this observation.184
A second dimension of unreasonableness is efficacy: a discretionary
implementational decision could be thought of as unreasonable if the chosen means are
ill-suited to achieve the desired ends. Considerations of cause and effect are a basic facet
of rational thinking. And a third element of unreasonableness might be substantive: a
discretionary decision could be seen as unreasonable, however measured and efficacious
it might be, if it trenches on substantive rights or represents an inappropriate
consideration of manifestly relevant factors.
The most important question, of course, is how far a decision must stray from
perfection in order to be “unreasonable.” There is a large difference, for example,
between requiring an implementational decision to be the least restrictive alternative and
requiring it to be plausibly related to the desired end. For now, however, let us leave that
181
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critical question aside. It is enough for present purposes to recognize that the abstract
principle of reasonableness was a foundational principle of delegated implementational
power in eighteenth century English common law.
One of the great innovations of American constitutionalism is the idea that all
governmental power stems from a delegation. All powers of federal actors are delegated
powers. Accordingly, when the Constitution delegated discretionary implementational
powers to federal actors in 1788, it is eminently sensible to suppose that those delegations
carried with them the common law principle of reasonableness. Consider, for instance,
the President’s “executive Power” to execute the laws. Could the President, exercising
discretion in the selection of forms and means of law enforcement, apprehend a suspect
holed up in Concord by leveling the entire town? Could the President, exercising
discretion in the forms and means of legal interpretation, interpret laws by channeling the
spirit of Elvis? Could the President in 1790, prior to ratification of the Fourth
Amendment, exercise discretionary investigative powers by indiscriminately searching an
entire region? We think that all of these measures would be, not merely ill-advised, but
unconstitutional.185 The Article II Vesting Clause grants the President discretion in law
execution, but that discretion is bounded. Not everything done by the President, even in
the guise of executing the laws, is an exercise of the “executive Power” delegated
through the Constitution.
The same is true of the “judicial Power” granted by the Article III Vesting Clause.
Suppose that a federal judge exercises the “judicial Power” to decide a case by flipping a
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coin. The judge’s decision could certainly be reversed on appeal. The judge could
certainly be impeached and removed by Congress. But has the judge violated the
Constitution? We say yes.186 The case-deciding power granted by the Constitution’s
Article III Vesting Clause is not entirely unbounded. There is substantial room within
that grant of power for different methodologies, and even substantial room for error, but
at some point a judgment falls so far off the map that it simply ceases to be an exercise of
the judicial power. Not everything done by a judge, even in the guise of deciding a case,
is an exercise of the “judicial Power” within the meaning of Article III. The limits may
be broad, but there are limits.
The delegated powers to execute the laws and to decide cases are both
implementational, rather than ends-setting, powers. Accordingly, they necessarily carry
with them the principle of reasonableness in the exercise of discretionary delegated
powers. That principle did not need to be expressly stated in the Constitution because it
is part of the very nature of delegations of implementational powers such as the
“executive Power” and the “judicial Power” as understood in eighteenth-century common
law.
The common law principle of reasonableness was never applied to Parliament (or,
more precisely, to the King or Queen in Parliament). It was a principle that applied only
to discretionary authority delegated from Parliament, not to supreme legislative authority.
Indeed, the law imposed no limits, of reasonableness or otherwise, on the legislative
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supremacy of Parliament,187 which stood above the other two governmental departments
in the legal hierarchy.
The Congress under the American Constitution, of course, is not Parliament.
Congress is not hierarchically superior to the executive or judicial departments.
Congress, as does the President and the federal courts, exercises only delegated power,
and that power is far from limitless. If the principle of reasonableness derives solely
from the existence of delegated discretionary power, then it would follow that the
delegated authority of Congress is subject to constraints of proportionality, efficacy, and
substantive reasonableness. But would a cautious eighteenth-century lawyer be satisfied
with that inference? Could someone plausibly argue that the principle of reasonableness
does not apply to Parliament simply because Parliament (at least in its legislative guise)
exercises legislative rather than implementational executive or judicial power? If that is
the correct basis for refusing to extend the principle of reasonableness to Parliament, it
would apply as well to Congress, in which case grants of enumerated power to Congress
would not necessarily carry with them a requirement of reasonableness in the exercise of
discretion. Accordingly, it makes sense to specify a constitutional constraint on
Congress’s discretionary powers if such a constraint is desired.
The language of the Sweeping Clause elegantly subjects Congress’s
implementational legislative powers to the principle of reasonableness. The phrase
“necessary and proper for carrying into Execution” is an excellent way to describe
requirements of proportionality, efficacy, and substantive reasonableness. A measure is
“necessary” if it is proportionate, and it is “proper” if it is well suited to its task
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(efficacious) and substantively reasonable. It is no accident that when the modern
European Court of Justice described the principle of proportionality, it said that the
principle, inter alia, requires measures to be “appropriate and necessary in order to
achieve the objectives legitimately pursued by the legislation in question.”188
In sum, there are very good reasons why the federal Constitution would textually
specify in the Sweeping Clause that executory laws must be “necessary and proper” but
would not use equivalent language in Article II or Article III. Discretionary executive
and judicial powers, by their nature, carry with them the principle of reasonableness.
Perhaps that is true as well of delegated legislative power (or perhaps at least of delegated
implementational legislative power), so that a requirement of reasonableness would exist
even in the absence of the “necessary and proper” language in the Sweeping Clause, but
the matter is open enough to question to make it prudent to specify the desired limitation
on Congress.
The treaty power, we contend, is an implementational, executive power delegated
in Article II. Accordingly, it carries the principle of reasonableness by its nature, without
need for textual specification. The absence of “necessary and proper” language in the
Treaty Clause does not point away from a requirement of a means-ends “fit” for treaties-no more than it does for other delegated Article II and Article III powers. Just as
exercises of the law-execution and case-deciding powers must be proportionate,
efficacious, and substantively reasonable, the same is true of exercises of the treatymaking power. It remains to be determined, of course, whether the degree of
proportionality, efficaciousness, and reasonableness required of treaties is greater,
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smaller, or the same as the degree required of executory legislation under the Sweeping
Clause, exercises of law-enforcement discretion, or exercises of judicial power, but the
basic principle of reasonableness applies to treaties.

3. Jeffersonian Treaties

The implementational view of treaties thus reads the Treaty Clause as an
executive power that is, by its nature, subject to a requirement that exercises of the treaty
power be “necessary and proper for carrying into Execution” other federal powers. The
baseline constitutional presumption is that executive powers are implementational; the
elements of the constitutionally-granted “executive Power” that are not purely
implementational are quite limited, both in number and in sphere of application. There is
especially good reason to apply this presumption in the case of the treaty power, because
tearing it loose from its implementational moorings, and the implicit “necessary and
proper for carrying into Execution” requirement that goes with that designation, would
leave it without obvious limits. This would be, to say the least, anomalous for an
executive power. The Treaty Clause thus seems much more like the usual run of purely
implementational executive powers than like the few odd executive powers that make the
President a lawmaker. An implementational treaty power makes sense in the context of
Article II. It also makes sense in the context of the Constitution as a whole, to which we
next turn.

VI. TAKING CONSEQUENCES SERIOUSLY: THE STRUCTURAL ROLE OF THE TREATY
CLAUSE
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Constitutional clauses do not exist in a vacuum. The actual clauses of the actual
Constitution were presented to the public in 1787 as an integrated package. We know,
for instance, that the Article II Vesting Clause grants the President the executive power of
the United States rather than, say, the executive power of Connecticut because we can
read the Article II Vesting Clause (which, unlike the Article III Vesting Clause, contains
no specific mention of the United States) in pari materia with the provisions that surround
it. A conversation about constitutional meaning, whether in 1787 or today, would only
be sensible if it considered how interpretations of various clauses would interact with
other clauses.

A. The Treaty Clause in Constitutional Context

Consider a treaty in which the President and the Senate agree to make noncitizens eligible for the presidency, in apparent violation of the clause providing that
“[n]o Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at the time
of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of President . . . .”189
Is that treaty provision domestically enforceable as the supreme law of the land? If the
Treaty Clause is read as a jurisdictional grant, there is nothing in the Treaty Clause to
suggest any limitation on the content of treaties. Nonetheless, the treaty provision is
clearly inoperative on any plausible understanding of the Treaty Clause. As a matter of
domestic law, the Constitution is hierarchically superior to all other forms of law,
189
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including statutes and treaties. The same reasoning by inference that led John Marshall
correctly to place the Constitution above federal statutes also leads to the conclusion that
the Constitution is supreme over treaties. The Eligibility Clause, unlike some provisions
such as the First Amendment or the Slave Trade Clause, is framed in sufficiently general
terms to apply to all federal actions, regardless of their form. It accordingly forbids the
treaty provision in question.
Once it is acknowledged that treaties cannot violate the Constitution, the trick
becomes to determine what counts as a constitutional violation. Surely treaties cannot do
what the Constitution expressly forbids to all actors, including the President and Senate,
such as granting titles of nobility or withdrawing money from the Treasury without an
appropriation. Thus, provisions of the Constitution framed as “thou shalt nots” apply to
the treaty power whenever their terms encompass the treaty-making authority and not
simply a more specific constitutional actor such as Congress.
Another kind of constitutional violation would be an attempt to accomplish
actions through forms other than those prescribed by the Constitution. A treaty could not,
for instance, permit a revenue measure to originate in the Senate, dispense with the
presentment requirement, or permit the delegation of legislative power. And if France
took objection to the location of Vermont’s capital in the French-sounding city of
Montpelier, and accordingly demanded as a condition of a commercial treaty that
Vermont be deprived of its voice in the Senate, the federal treaty-makers could not agree
to that condition.
These propositions about the inability of treaties to alter constitutional form and
structure, of course, are not compelled by any specific textual provision. Nor does the
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Constitution have specific textual provisions stating that the House, Senate, and President
under Article I, section 7, the President under the non-treaty powers in Article II, or the
federal judiciary in Article III cannot alter basic structural arrangements. No such
express provision is necessary because, as Chief Justice Marshall recognized in Marbury,
it is structurally clear that the Constitution is supreme law. Moreover, the Constitution
prescribes a specific amendment process, which by inference creates a very strong
presumption against alteration of the Constitution through other means. As a general
interpretative principle, power grants to federal actors do not include the power to alter
the Constitution unless that power is clearly given.190
Hence, the seemingly unqualified power to “make Treaties,” whatever its scope or
nature, is really a power to “make Treaties that are consistent with provisions of the
Constitution allocating federal governmental power and that do not violate prohibitory
provisions of the Constitution framed broadly enough to apply to the treaty-making
authority.”
But what about prohibitory provisions that are not framed broadly enough to
apply to the treaty-making authority? Suppose that in order to secure certain trade
concessions with France, a treaty includes a provision demanded by the French that
perpetually forbids all Americans from publishing any criticisms of France or the French
government. The First Amendment, recall, does not apply to treaties because they are not
acts of Congress. Of course, to the extent that the treaty requires congressional
implementation, the First Amendment would pose a problem, but that could be avoided
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by making the treaty provision self-executing, perhaps by giving the French government
power to enforce the prohibition through civil actions for libel. Does the Constitution
permit the American treaty-makers to refashion state libel law in this manner? And what
if the French--in accordance with fears actually voiced at the North Carolina ratifying
convention--further added a provision mandating that Catholicism be declared the official
religion of the United States?191 Is that concession within the power of the President and
Senate? If the answer is “no,” it is not by virtue of anything contained in the First
Amendment or any other express provision of the Constitution; it must be by virtue of
something internal to the treaty power. Finally, suppose that the French, once again upset
by the location of Vermont’s capital in the French-sounding city of Montepelier, demand
as a condition of a trade agreement that the capital be moved to an Anglo-sounding city
such as Burlington. Congress clearly has no enumerated power to alter state capitals, but
does anything prevent the treaty-making authorities from agreeing to the deal, which then
becomes “the supreme Law of the Land”?
Most significantly, consider the effect of the Slave Trade Clause, which as we
noted earlier does not, by its terms, apply to the treaty power. This clause protected
regulation of the slave trade for the Nation’s first twenty years against ordinary
legislation, even by unanimous majorities in both Houses. Article V, without any special
provision for the Slave Trade Clause, would have entrenched that firewall against
combined majorities (and even some supermajorities) in the House, Senate, and the state
191
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legislatures: it would have taken a two-thirds majority in each House or a two-thirds
majority of the state legislatures to propose an amendment repealing the Slave Trade
Clause, and it would then have taken a three-fourths majority of the states to ratify the
amendment. Article V, with its special proviso that exempted the Slave Trade Clause
from the amendment process, protected the slave trade against even that unlikely
supermajoritarian combination. Thus, until 1808, no possible combination – not even a
unanimous combination -- of the President, the Congress, and the state legislatures could
have prohibited the slave trade. But if the treaty power is an independent grant of
jurisdiction that is not limited to implementing other enumerated powers, then the
President plus two-thirds of a quorum of the Senate nonetheless could have abolished the
slave trade by treaty if only the thought had occurred to them. Such a treaty would not
have violated any specific prohibition in the Constitution or altered any structural form of
action specified in the Constitution. It simply would have done what no other possible
combination of constitutional actors, including the amending authorities, had the
enumerated power to do. A Constitution that permitted pre-1808 abolition of the slave
trade would, of course, have been a good Constitution. The question for interpreters,
however, is whether it is a plausible Constitution.192
If the Treaty Clause does give the President and the Senate power to alter state
capitals, disestablish state religions, or end the slave trade before 1808, then the entire
federal structure, apart from a few fortuitously worded prohibitions on federal action in
Article I, section 9, is a President and two-thirds of a quorum of senators (and perhaps a
bona fide demand from a foreign government) away from destruction. That is, of course,
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not an impossible circumstance. Some Anti-federalists desperately feared it, even if they
did not articulate their concerns in precisely the manner that we have done.193 But in
light of the overarching structure and themes of the Constitution, that is a conclusion that
one ought to reach only with some hesitation. The potential existence of a “back door”
that would permit federal treaty makers to declare a national religion, dictate the location
of state capitals, and abolish the slave trade in 1789 is intriguing enough to warrant a bit
more interpretative energy with respect to the treaty power.
One could, of course, suggest that the Treaty Clause’s requirement of two-thirds
consent by the Senate, the body initially selected by the states themselves and in which
each state has equal representation, is the only safeguard provided against misuse of the
treaty power.194 Structurally, however, the provision for supermajority Senate approval
does not support any strong inferences about the scope of the treaty power. As John
McGinnis and Michael Rappaport have pointed out in a powerful article, most of the
Constitution is supermajoritarian.195 Ordinary legislation must pass through two different
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branches of the legislature that are (at least under the original constitutional design)
selected by different majorities.196 It must then be presented to the President, who
represents yet a different majority. Passage through all three legislative units thus
requires approval by three separate majorities, which is a pretty fair description of a
supermajority requirement. And if the President vetoes a bill, it can become law only
with a two-thirds majority of both the House and the Senate. Article V requires either
two-thirds majorities in both Houses of Congress or a convention called by two-thirds of
the state legislatures for the proposal of constitutional amendments and ratification by
three-quarters of the states for the adoption of such amendments. In light of the
Constitution’s pervasive supermajoritarian theme, a requirement of approval by the
President and by two-thirds of the Senate for treaties is not a small matter by any means,
but it is not so extraordinary that it short-circuits an inquiry into substantive limits on the
treaty power.
In the end, the power to make implementational law by carrying other enumerated
powers into effect in the international arena makes sense across all fronts. It fulfills the
purpose of treaties to permit the United States to enter into and acquire binding
commitments from foreign nations. It acknowledges the lawmaking character of the
treaty power while still grounding it in the larger structure of Article II. And, most
importantly, it prevents the Treaty Clause from unraveling the rest of the constitutional
scheme. If the Treaty Clause is read as jurisdiction-extending, one must either figure out
some way to limit it, the difficulty of which is demonstrated by two centuries of debates,
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or maintain that the middle of Article II contains a constitutional joker. To put it bluntly,
an authorization to implement other grants of jurisdiction makes sense in the overall
context of the Constitution, while a grant of jurisdiction to pursue independent ends does
not.
There is no a priori requirement that the Constitution make sense, but if one is
trying to project how a fully informed eighteenth-century audience, knowing all that there
is to know about the Constitution and the surrounding world, would have understood the
power to “make Treaties,” the implementational view looks pretty good. To read the
Treaty Clause as an end-setting provision, with no direct connection to the otherwise
careful enumerations of federal powers, simply does too much damage to the rest of the
Constitution to be a plausible reading of a brief clause in Article II, section 2. Once
again, Jefferson was right.
We must still determine in precisely what fashion Jefferson was right. There is an
ambiguity in the notion of an “implementational” treaty power. On the strictest
understanding, treaties can only be used to carry into effect powers already exercised by
other governmental actors. Thus, if Congress tries to regulate foreign commerce in a way
that requires the agreement of a foreign sovereign, a treaty could validly implement that
prior exercise of the lawmaking power. But on this understanding, a treaty could not
regulate foreign commerce without first having an exercise of congressional power to
implement. This would directly assimilate the treaty power into the the executive power,
which carries into effect laws that already exist.
That is not, however, the only sense in which a power can be “implementational.”
Consider the Sweeping Clause. The Clause is an implementational power in that it only
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grants Congress power to pass laws “for carrying into Execution” other granted powers.
But Congress does not need to wait for those other powers actually to be exercised in
order to use its authority under the Sweeping Clause. For instance, Congress could
appropriate funds and authorize the appointment of officers for the negotiation of a
particular treaty, even if the President ultimately chooses not to negotiate the treaty at all.
Indeed, because all appropriations come from acts of Congress pursuant to the Sweeping
Clause, such legislation often must be enacted before the power that Congress seeks to
implement is exercised. On this understanding of an “implementational” power, the
power can “pave the way” for the exercise of powers elsewhere granted to institutions of
the national government without awaiting the actual exercise of those powers.
There is yet a third possibility to consider. In his September 7, 1803 letter to
Wilson Cary Nicholas expressing his view of the treaty power, Jefferson said that the
Constitution “specifies & delineates the operations permitted to the federal government,
and gives all the powers necessary to carry these into execution. Whatever of these
enumerated objects is proper for a law, Congress may make the law; whatever is proper
to be executed by way of a treaty, the President & Senate may enter into the treaty . . . .”
If one emphasizes the phrase “enumerated objects,” one can come up with a “hybrid”
conception of the treaty power that permits it, on some occasions, to function as a standalone power. The Constitution’s power-granting provisions can be viewed as the
specification of ends or goals that the national government may permissibly pursue.
Thus, the Commerce Clause specifies the permissible end or goal of regulating foreign
commerce. A treaty, on this hybrid understanding, can be used to pursue this otherwisespecified end, but it need not be tied in any way to an exercise of congressional power.
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That is, the President and the Senate would have an independent jurisdiction to enter into
treaties regulating foreign commerce, even if Congress has not acted,197 but they could
only exercise this independent power in connection with ends specified in some provision
of the Constitution other than the Treaty Clause.
This was not, of course, Jefferson’s own position. Jefferson, we should recall,
believed that treaties cannot concern matters that could “otherwise be regulated” or
matters in which the Constitution “gave a participation to the House of Representatives.”
In other words, where the Constitution specified a particular form for action, Jefferson
regarded that form as exclusive. The person to whom Jefferson wrote on September 7,
1803, however, articulated a position fairly close to this hybrid view. In a letter to
Jefferson of September 3, 1803, Wilson Cary Nicholas, then a Virginia senator, tried to
dissuade Jefferson from expressing doubts about the constitutionality of the Louisiana
Purchase or from articulating an unduly narrow conception of the treaty power. He
explained that he did not “see anything in the constitution that limits the treaty power,
except the general limitation of the power given to the government, and the evident
object for which the government was instituted.”198 By “the general limitation of the
power given to the government,” one can easily mean “the ends and objects that
institutions of the federal government may permissibly pursue under their enumerated
powers.” This understanding is consistent with the views expressed by George Nicholas
at the Virginia ratifying convention, in which he said that no treaty could be made “which
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shall be repugnant to the spirit of the Constitution, or inconsistent with the delegated
powers.”199
This hybrid position has the typical virtues and vices of a compromise. Its
primary virtue is that it gives wide effect to the arguably “legis” aspect of the treaty
power while providing clearly marked boundaries for the exercise of the power. Its
primary, and fatal, vice is that it misunderstands the Constitution. The Constitution does
not specify permissible ends for the national government to pursue. Rather, it grants
specific powers to specific institutions of the national government. In that sense, it
specifies permissible ends, as well as permissible means, but they are not ends and means
for “the national government” as a unitary entity. The hybrid view amounts to saying
that every power granted to any institution of the national government is also
independently granted to the President and the Senate: Congress (and the President) can
regulate foreign commerce by statute, so the President and Senate can regulate foreign
commerce by treaty. But changing the example shows the deep flaw in this approach:
Congress and the state legislatures can amend the Constitution, so can the President and
Senate amend the Constitution by treaty? No, no, one immediately objects. When
Article V confers the amendment power, it confers it on specific institutions to be
exercised in a specific form. It does not simply specify an abstract end of amending the
Constitution; it also designates the proper institution and form for pursuing that end.
That is true, but it is as true of the foreign commerce power as it is of Article V
This means that compromise is not possible. Either the Treaty Clause is an
independent grant of subject-matter jurisdiction to the President and Senate or it is a
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power to carry into effect (whether prospectively or after-the-fact) valid exercises of
power by other federal governmental actors. For the reasons that we have already given,
the latter view makes the most sense in light of the Constitution’s architecture. The
remaining question is whether the treaty power is “triggered” only by prior exercises of
constitutional authority or may also be used, a la the Sweeping Clause, to facilitate
anticipated exercises of authority. For our purposes, nothing of consequence turns on this
question, though the latter view makes more sense in view of the general character of
implementational authority. All things considered, the best way to integrate the treaty
power into the constitutional structure is to treat it as an implementing mechanism for all
federal powers.
It is, of course, always dangerous to reason from conclusions to interpretations.
Unless one fully equates the meaning of a provision with its intended results, which we
do not, one must acknowledge the possibility that the Constitution might fail to achieve at
least some of the ends that were expected of it. We therefore are not claiming that odd
results can overcome a clear contextual meaning. But as we have endeavored to show,
the case for reading the Treaty Clause as an independent head of jurisdiction is far from
contextually clear. The stark language of the Treaty Clause does not, as some have
claimed, settle that question. Rather, it requires us to determine how a fully informed
eighteenth-century observer would have understood the Constitution’s power to “make
Treaties.” Paradigm cases, particularly paradigm cases as extreme as the ones that we
have invoked, are relevant to that inquiry. If an interpretation of the Treaty Clause is
available that avoids the kinds of major sinkholes into which other interpretations get
sucked, that is a point, albeit not a conclusive one, in its favor.
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B. Treaties’ Domains

Once we make that move, however, we must identify the breadth and depth of the
sinkholes to which our own interpretation is vulnerable. What kinds of treaty provisions
that an eighteenth-century observer would have regarded as unproblematic would the
Jeffersonian implementational interpretation call into question?
Treaties of peace are no problem for the Jeffersonian view. Although Congress
cannot terminate a war, and the Treaty Clause therefore cannot be used to implement any
such congressional power, the President can terminate a war.200 Peace treaties can then
formalize and set the terms of--in other words, can implement--the state of peace created
by the President, which is precisely what the implementational theory of the Treaty
Clause contemplates. Because the treaty power is implementational, the treaty could not
end the war without concomitant presidential action, but because the treaty itself cannot
exist without presidential action to put it before the Senate, that is a matter of no moment.
The more interesting question is what kinds of concessions can be made in peace
treaties. To say that the President and Senate can execute a peace treaty is not to say that
they can do so any terms whatsoever. On the implementational view, any provision in a
peace treaty, as in any other treaty, must carry into effect some constitutional power of
some federal actor. Recognition of a state of peace effectuates the President’s
peacemaking powers, but peace treaties often do much more than declare peace. In
particular, peace treaties, and other treaties as well, are often occasions for the exchange
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of territory. Vasan Kesavan has recently demonstrated, at great length, that the general
understanding at the time of the framing was that treaties permitted the cession of
American territory, including territory that was part of a state, without the consent of the
state in which the territory was located. We accept the proposition that a fully-informed
eighteenth-century audience would have been startled to discover that the federal
government had no power to cede territory, even as part of a peace settlement. The
implementational view of the Treaty Clause is consistent with this expectation--up to a
point.
There is no problem at all with treaties ceding territory that belongs exclusively to
the United States. Congress can cede that property by ordinary legislation through its
power under the Property Clause to “dispose of . . . Territory or other Property belonging
to the United States,”201 and there is accordingly no issue about implementing that power
through treaty. The Property Clause, however, does not authorize Congress to dispose of
territory belonging to a state. What if the requested price for peace, or even for a
particularly attractive commercial treaty, is Maine, Vermont, and New Hampshire?
Our answer is that state territory can be ceded away as part of a peace settlement
but not otherwise. Once the treaty power is seen as wholly implementational, there is no
arguable power in any federal actor to alienate state territory during peacetime and
therefore nothing for the treaty power to implement. During wartime, however, the
President has the power to “cede” state territory by refusing to defend it (or by defending
it and losing). Once territory is occupied by an invading foreign sovereign, the invader,
pursuant to international law, gets to govern the territory in accordance with its own
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political institutions. A treaty of peace that formally cedes the conquered territory
thereby implements the presidential decision to sacrifice part of the country during
wartime in order to save the rest.
The joker in the deck, of course, is the Guarantee Clause, which provides that
“[t]he United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of
Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion . . . .”202 Does this Clause
forbid the President, either as commander-in-chief or as treaty-maker, from making a
tactical decision to sacrifice one state to save another by imposing a duty to protect
“each” of the states against invasion?
There are two ways to understand this clause. First, it might impose on the
President a duty to defend in good faith every part of the country with equal vigor. This
understanding would satisfy the concern that the President might neglect invasions in
disfavored areas or play geographical favorites in the event of a large-scale invasion.203
It would also permit the President to surrender state territory in a good-faith exercise of
tactical judgment, and accordingly would permit the formal transfer of such territory in
peace treaties. Alternatively, the Guarantee Clause might be read as an absolute
prohibition on the surrender of any state territory under any circumstances. This would
mean that if any part of the Union fell to foreign invasion, the entire Union must fight to
the death until the invader is repelled or the Union ceases to exist as a viable political
entity. This understanding would, of course, forbid treaties of cession--but it would do so
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even on a much broader understanding of the scope of the Treaty Clause. The Guarantee
Clause, after all, is phrased as a duty imposed on “[t]he United States” and accordingly
extends to the treaty-making authority. Even if the Treaty Clause was an independent
head of jurisdiction for the national government, it would be limited by the duties
imposed by the Guarantee Clause, including any putative duty to refuse to surrender state
territory. Thus, if the federal government is forbidden from surrendering state territory, it
is not because of anything peculiar to the implementational view of the treaty power, but
because of the supervening force of the Guarantee Clause.
The implementational view does, however, limit the circumstances under which
state territory can be ceded. State territory can be ceded as part of a peace settlement, but
not as part of ordinary commercial relations. Northern New England could not be traded
away for fishing rights in the Gulf of Mexico or favorable tariff status for cotton. We do
not believe that a fully-informed eighteenth-century audience would have been
scandalized by this outcome.
Treaties of acquisition pose some complicated problems, which we have explored
at considerable length elsewhere.204 The short answer is that the United States may
acquire territory by treaty whenever it is reasonable to do so in order to implement an
enumerated power, such as the power to admit new states205 or the power to provide and
maintain a navy.206 Most of America’s acquisitions by treaty easily satisfy this test. The
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acquisition of the Philippines probably did not,207 and the acquisition of Alaska was a
close call.208
Treaties of commerce are among the most common types of treaties. Such
treaties can fix the terms of trade, set tariff levels, or grant navigational rights. A treaty
power that did not include the ability to enter into such agreements would be as peculiar
as a treaty power that did not authorize treaties of peace.
Such treaties are permissible as vehicles for implementing the congressional
powers to “lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises”209 and to “regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations.”210 The implementational character of the treaty power
does mean, however, that treaties cannot unilaterally set tariff rates or trade rules without
congressional action. They can carry into effect statutes that already exist. They can
establish frameworks that are triggered by subsequent statutes. But they cannot create
free-standing regulatory regimes.
This understanding is contrary to established practice, but not so contrary to
eighteenth-century expectations that it threatens to take the implementational view of
treaties off the table. Under conventional understandings of the treaty power, in which
treaties can fix tariff levels or terms of trade, those treaties “bind” the United States as a
matter of international law, but not as a matter of domestic law. Subsequent
congressional statutes that violate the terms of the treaty are perfectly valid as a matter of
domestic law. They may embroil the United States in international problems, but they
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are not, in any meaningful sense, “unconstitutional.” Full effectiveness of a treaty always
requires the collaboration of Congress, if only through inaction, even if one views treaties
as self-executing (that is, as taking effect without legislative implementation). Our view
is not all that different in substance. Under an implementational theory of treaties,
treaties of commerce always require the collaboration of Congress through affirmative
action: Congress must either enact a statute for the treaty to implement or, if no such
statute yet exists, the treaty can at most establish a contingent legal framework that is
triggered by congressional action. Put in the language of modern debates, treaties are not
self-executing with respect to Congress, though they are self-executing with respect to
the states by virtue of the Supremacy Clause.
Of course, in the process of “implementing” an exercise of power embodied in a
specific statute, a treaty “dis-implements” subsequent exercises of the same power by
attaching international legal consequences to the enactment of statutes that are
inconsistent with the terms of the treaty. But that is always a possibility with
implementational powers. The Property Clause, for instance, is both substantive and
implementational: the power to dispose of and regulate federal property is a selfcontained authorization of both means and ends. Suppose that Congress exercises the
power to “dispose of . . . Property belonging to the United States” by vesting a land title
in a private person. That statute “dis-implements” future acts that seek to, for instance,
make the property part of a post road. Congress can, in fact, make the land part of a post
road even after it has been vested in a private party, but there are legal consequences that
attach to that action--namely, an obligation to provide just compensation for the taking of
property. More directly, if the executive “implements” a statutory scheme by entering
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into contracts, those contracts create legal obligations that “dis-implement” future
actions, in the sense of attaching legal consequences to future actions that are inconsistent
with the original implementing act. Treaties have the same status and effect. The treatymaking authority can bind the United States as a matter of international law in the course
of implementing enumerated powers, in the sense of making future legislative action bear
legal consequences. That is a significant result, of course, which is why the treaty power
is a significant power.
A more vexing problem concerns treaty provisions that address subjects typically
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the states, such as private-law rights of tort, contract,
property, and descent. It is commonplace to give foreign emissaries broad immunity
from local laws and broad powers that states might not otherwise give to aliens. It was
also commonplace in the founding era. On July 29, 1789, the Senate ratified a treaty with
France that had been negotiated by the Confederation government involving reciprocal
privileges of consuls and vice-consuls,211 which “trenched more deeply on state
prerogatives than any of the other previous treaties negotiated under the Confederation”
by, inter alia, granting “consular officials and employees and consular premises extensive
immunities from the operation of state laws (though not compelled to do so by the law of
nations) . . . .” 212 What power, if any, do treaty provisions of this kind implement?
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The only possible power is the President’s power under Article II to “receive
Ambassadors and other public Ministers.”213 Blackstone understood the English King’s
power to receive foreign emissaries to include, as a necessary incident, the power to
receive them free of the normal constraints of municipal law: “[t]he rights, the powers,
the duties, and the privileges of embassadors are determined by the law of nature and
nations, and not by any municipal constitution.”214 If the President’s constitutional power
to “receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers” includes the right to receive them
under similar conditions of immunity,215 then a treaty could implement that power. Of
course, in order to know whether the 1789 Consular Convention was constitutional, one
would need to explore whether the power (and perhaps duty) to grant immunity to foreign
emissaries extended to consuls216 and whether it included all of the provisions contained
in that treaty. We are less interested in the answer to that question than in the general
principle that determines the scope of the treaty power to grant rights and immunities to
foreign emissaries.
Foreign citizens, as opposed to official foreign emissaries, are a different story.
One of the most contentious foreign relations issues in early American history was the
extent to which treaties, either under the authority of the Articles of Confederation or of
the Constitution, could give alien citizens rights to own and dispose of real property
213

U.S. Const. art II, § 3.
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contrary to state law, presumably in exchange for similar rights for American citizens in
foreign countries. The best-known example is Article 9 of the Jay Treaty of 1795, which
declared that “British Subjects who now hold Lands in the Territories of the United States
. . . shall continue to hold them according to the nature and Tenures of their respective
Estates and Titles therein, and may grant Sell or Devise the same to whom they please, in
like manner as if they were Natives.”217 Just where did federal treaty negotiators get the
power to dictate state rules of property ownership and descent?
They didn’t. An implementational view of the Treaty Clause would not permit
provisions of this nature. If that limitation unduly burdened federal treaty-makers, they
would need a constitutional amendment to authorize reciprocal property-ownership
provisions and other provisions that involve powers not otherwise allocated to some
federal institution. As the founding-era controversies over such provisions demonstrates,
a significant portion of the actual eighteenth-century public would have found this
conclusion wholly congenial. If the hypothetical, fully informed eighteenth-century
audience that is the target of our inquiry would have been at all distressed by that
conclusion, we suspect that it would be far more surprised by a conclusion that the slave
trade could have been ended in 1789 if only the President could have mustered a twothirds majority of a quorum of the Senate.

C. The Epistemology of the Treaty Clause

217

Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, Nov 19, 1794, United States-Great Britain, art 9, 8 Stat
116, 122.

104

Suppose, however, that the reader is not convinced. After all, even if we are right
that the textual and structural case for a treaty power that extends to any subject is not, as
Professor Golove would have it, “compelling, even overwhelming,”218 that does not
establish that the Jeffersonian interpretation is correct either. If both conceptions of the
treaty power--the jurisdiction-extending view and the implementational view--can be
advanced plausibly in terms of text and structure, where does one go from there?
As we have elsewhere argued at some length,219 the default rule for federal power
is, “when in doubt, don’t.” In other words, the burden of proof always rests with the
proponent of federal governmental power. If someone wants to claim that the federal
treaty power includes the power to make treaties on matters that are not within the
enumerated powers of any federal institution, that person must overcome a presumption
against any such power. That anti-power presumption is not grounded in normative or
political concerns. It is grounded in the basic epistemological principle that he who
asserts the affirmative existence of something must prove it. Because the federal
Constitution creates the national government as a government of enumerated powers, the
existence of a specific federal power is always a matter for proof. Once that power is
established, the existence of an external limitation on that power is a matter for proof, so
the epistemological presumption does not always work against governmental power.
Quite to the contrary, it works in favor of governmental power when one is discussing
constitutional restraints on either the federal or state governments in the form of “thou
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shalt nots.” But for the threshold question of determining the scope of enumerated
federal powers, the balance always tilts away from the power.
How strongly the balance tilts depends on the strength of the presumption against
grants of federal power. That, in turn, depends on the proper standard of proof for claims
of constitutional meaning generally and for claims of federal power in particular. That is
a project for another day. For now, it is enough simply to note that doubts about the
scope of the treaty power should, all else being equal, be resolved against an expansive
view of the power. On that point as well, Jefferson was right.

VII. TAKING DOUBTS SERIOUSLY: A JEFFERSONIAN CONCLUSION

To be sure, the Jeffersonian view of the treaty power has significant flaws, not the
least of which is its relative dearth of direct historical support. But every other view of
the treaty power has its own problems with which to contend. In other words, we view
Jefferson’s interpretation of the Treaty Clause through the same epistemological lens as
did Jefferson himself. Jefferson’s notes of Washington Administration Cabinet
conferences from 1793 describe a discussion among some of the nation’s then-brightest
luminaries about the form and effect of President Washington’s forthcoming Neutrality
Proclamation. Alexander Hamilton evidently initiated a discussion of the treaty power by
declaring that, although the President could not unilaterally foreclose a congressional
declaration of war by issuing a proclamation, “the constn having given power to the
President and Senate to make treaties, they might make a treaty of neutrality which
should take from Congress the right to declare war in that particular case, and that under
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the form of a treaty they might exercise any powers whatever, even those exclusively
given by the constn to the H. of representatives.”220 Edmund Randolph countered “that
where they undertook to do acts by treaty (as to settle a tariff of duties,) which were
exclusively given to the legislature, that an act of the legislature would be necessary to
confirm them . . . .”221 Jefferson, for his part, insisted, as he would later do in his
parliamentary manual, “that in givg to the Prest & Senate a power to make treaties, the
constn meant only to authorize them to carry into effect by way of treaty any powers they
might constitutionally exercise.”222 Jefferson noted that he “was sensible of the weak
points in this position, but there were still weaker in the other hypothesis . . . .”223 We
could not have put it better, and we will not try.
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